In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by encouraging him.  It has the former effect when it determines him to leave undone what he wanted to do.  He sees, I mean, that other people do not do it; and from this he judges, in general, that it is not expedient; that it may endanger his person, or his property, or his honour.

He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining into the matter for himself.  Or he may see that another man, who has not refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is example of the deterrent kind.  The example which encourages a man works in a twofold manner.  It either induces him to do what he would be glad to leave undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might in some way endanger him, or injure him in others’ opinion; or else it encourages him to do what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained from doing from fear of danger or shame; this is example of the seductive kind.  Finally, example may bring a man to do what he would have otherwise never thought of doing.  It is obvious that in this last case example works in the main only on the intellect; its effect on the will is secondary, and if it has any such effect, it is by the interposition of the man’s own judgment, or by reliance on the person who presented the example.

The whole influence of example—­and it is very strong—­rests on the fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and that he is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one else.  Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these qualities, the more is he open to the influence of example; and we find, in fact, that most men’s guiding star is the example of others; that their whole course of life, in great things and in small, comes in the end to be mere imitation; and that not even in the pettiest matters do they act according to their own judgment.  Imitation and custom are the spring of almost all human action.  The cause of it is that men fight shy of all and any sort of reflection, and very properly mistrust their own discernment.  At the same time this remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his kinship with apes.

But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man’s character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce one man and deter another.  An easy opportunity of observing this is afforded in the case of certain social impertinences which come into vogue and gradually spread.  The first time that a man notices anything of the kind, he may say to himself:  For shame! how can he do it! how selfish and inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to do anything like that.  But twenty others will think:  Aha! if he does that, I may do it too.