But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of view.  The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency in that natural philosophy—­natural, and therefore resting on mere feeling—­which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of his person can do him little harm.  But it is just this very assurance that would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader will recollect from my Ethics, Courage comes from the same source as the virtues of Justice and Humanity.  This is, I admit, to take a very high view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why cowardice seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime thing; for no lower point of view enables me to see why a finite individual who is everything to himself—­nay, who is himself even the very fundamental condition of the existence of the rest of the world—­should not put his own preservation above every other aim.  It is, then, an insufficient explanation of Courage to make it rest only on utility, to give it an empirical and not a transcendental character.  It may have been for some such reason that Calderon once uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion in regard to Courage, nay, actually denied its reality; and put his denial into the mouth of a wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign.  “Although,” he observed, “natural fear is operative in all alike, a man may be brave in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes Courage”: 

Que aunque el natural temor En todos obra igualmente, No mostrarle es ser valiente Y esto es lo que hace el valor.[1]

[Footnote 1:  La Hija del Aire, ii., 2.]

In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the ancients and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue, it must be remembered that by Virtue, virtus, [Greek:  aretae], the ancients understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy in itself, it might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only physical.  But when Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental tendency of life was moral, it was moral superiority alone than henceforth attached to the notion of Virtue.  Meanwhile the earlier usage still survived in the elder Latinists, and also in Italian writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the word virtuoso.  The special attention of students should be drawn to this wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise it might easily be a source of secret perplexity.  I may recommend two passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose.  One of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in which the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue.  The other pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good shoes.  This may also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient scheme of ethics virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place in ours.