of the Intellect. [Greek:  Sophrosynae], which Cicero translates Temperantia, is a very indefinite and ambiguous word, and it admits, therefore, of a variety of applications:  it may mean discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a level head.  Courage is not a virtue at all; although sometimes it is a servant or instrument of virtue; but it is just as ready to become the servant of the greatest villainy.  It is really a quality of temperament.  Even Geulinx (in the preface to this Ethics) condemned the Platonic virtues and put the following in their place:  Diligence, Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are obviously bad.  The Chinese distinguish five cardinal virtues:  Sympathy, Justice, Propriety, Wisdom, and Sincerity.  The virtues of Christianity are theological, not cardinal:  Faith, Love, and Hope.

Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either of Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and vices of mankind first diverge.  These two diametrically opposite qualities exist in every man; for they spring from the inevitable comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others.  According as the result of this comparison affects his individual character does the one or the other of these qualities become the source and principle of all his action.  Envy builds the wall between Thee and Me thicker and stronger; Sympathy makes it slight and transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether; and then the distinction between self and not-self vanishes.

Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage on which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a closer examination.  The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues, and cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in the Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance.  The result is that with the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue.  Nevertheless it must be admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with any nobility of character—­if only for the reason that it betrays an overgreat apprehension about one’s own person.

Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills that threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that lie in the future; whereas cowardice does the contrary.  But this readiness is of the same quality as patience, for patience consists in the clear consciousness that greater evils than those which are present, and that any violent attempt to flee from or guard against the ills we have may bring the others upon us.  Courage, then, would be a kind of patience; and since it is patience that enables us to practise forbearance and self control, Courage is, through the medium of patience, at least akin to virtue.