[Footnote 1:  Sec. 8.]

But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will is so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and perishable as man’s.  How shall a man be proud, when his conception is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a necessity!—­

  Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa,
  Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori!

Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule:  When you come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity.  Do not consider his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse ideas; as the former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to despise him; but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his anxieties, his pains.  Then you will always feel your kinship with him; you will sympathise with him; and instead of hatred or contempt you will experience the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the Gospel calls us.  The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly not to look for a man’s alleged “dignity,” but, on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity.

The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the cardinal vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make their appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices.  According to Schmidt’s History of the Eastern Mongolians the cardinal vices in the Buddhist scheme are four:  Lust, Indolence, Anger, and Avarice.  But probably instead of Indolence, we should read Pride; for so it stands in the Lettres edifiantes et curieuses,[1] where Envy, or Hatred, is added as a fifth.  I am confirmed in correcting the statement of the excellent Schmidt by the fact that my rendering agrees with the doctrine of the Sufis, who are certainly under the influence of the Brahmins and Buddhists.  The Sufis also maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and they arrange them in very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in connection with Avarice, and Anger with Pride.  The four cardinal virtues opposed to them would be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness and Humility.

[Footnote 1:  Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.]

When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are entertained by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues of Plato, which have been recapitulated again and again—­Justice, Valour, Temperance, and Wisdom—­it is plain that the latter are not based on any clear, leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are superficial and, in part, obviously false.  Virtues must be qualities of the will, but Wisdom is chiefly an attribute