A very fair statement of both views may be found in Macvane’s Political
Economy.

SECTION IX.—­PROHIBITIONS ON CONGRESS.

Clause 1.—­The Slave Trade.

The migration or importation of such persons[1] as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may he imposed on such importation,[2] not exceeding ten dollars for each person.[1]

[1] The framers of the constitution disliked to tarnish the instrument by using the word slave, and adopted this euphemism.

At that time there was a general desire, not ripened into a purpose however, that slavery might soon cease to exist in the United States.

This clause, which permitted the continuance for a time of the slave trade, was a concession to North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.  The other states had already prohibited the slave trade, and it was hoped by all that before the time specified the abolition of slavery would be gradually accomplished.

[2] No such tax was imposed.

This provision is now obsolete, and is of interest only historically. (For further discussion of slavery, see page 343.)

Clause 2.—­The Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

“It has been judicially decided that the right to suspend the privilege of the writ rests in congress, but that congress may by act give the power to the president.” [Footnote:  Lalor’s Cyclopedia of Political Economy]

The privilege of the writ never was suspended by the general government until 1861.  Questionable suspensions of the writ, covering a very limited territory, had been made in two or three instances by generals.

So valuable as a “bulwark of liberty” is this writ considered to be, that the courts of the United States have decided that, even in time of war, the privilege of the writ can be suspended only in that part of the country actually invaded, or in such a state of war as to obstruct the action of the federal courts.

Clause 3.—­Certain Laws Forbidden.

No bill of attainder[1] or ex post facto law[2] shall be passed.

[1] A bill of attainder was a legislative conviction for alleged crime, with judgment of death.  Those legislative convictions which imposed punishments less than that of death were called bills of pains and penalties. [Footnote:  Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations] The term is here used in its generic sense, so as to include bills of pains and penalties.

The great objection to bills of attainder is that they are purely judicial acts performed by a legislative body.  A legislative body may and should try a political offense, and render a verdict as to the worthiness of the accused to hold public office.  But to try him when conviction would deprive him of any of his personal rights—­life, liberty, or property,—­should be the work of a duly organized judicial body.