[2] The term first reported by the committee of the whole was seven years, with the provision forbidding re-election.  Some of the delegates were in favor of annual elections, while others thought that the executive should be elected for life or good behavior.  And other terms, varying from two to ten years, had their advocates.  After much discussion, the term of four years was agreed upon as a compromise, and no limitation was put upon the number of terms for which a person might be elected.

In another place it is made the duty of the president to recommended to congress such measures as he deems necessary for the good of the country.  He should, therefore, have a term long enough to fairly test his “policy” and to stimulate him to personal firmness in the execution of his duties, yet not so long as to free him from a sense of responsibility.  It was thought that a term of four years would cover both of the conditions mentioned.

[3] The purpose of having a vice-president is to provide a successor for the president in case of his disability or death.

CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT.

Clause 2.—­Number and Appointment of Electors.

Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in the congress; but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.

Three plans for the election of president and vice-president were proposed:  First, election by congress; second, election by the people; third, election by persons chosen by the people for that special purpose.

The objection to the first plan was, that it would rob the executive branch of that independence which in our plan of government it is designed to possess—­it would render the executive branch in a measure subordinate to the legislative.

The objections to the second plan came from two sources.  Some of the delegates feared that, inexperienced as they were, the people could not be trusted to act wisely in the choice of a president—­that they would be swayed by partizan feeling, instead of acting with cool deliberation.  And the small states feared that in a popular election their power would count for little.

Then the compromise in the organization of the congress was remembered, and it was resolved that the election of the president and vice-president should be placed in the hands of persons chosen for that special purpose, and that the number of the electors from each state should be that of its representation in congress.  This satisfied both parties.  Those who thought that the people could not be intrusted with so important a matter as the choice of the president, hoped that this mode would place the election in the hands of the wise men of the several states.  And the delegates from the small states secured in this all the concession which they could fairly ask.