Aristotle divides all conclusions into logical and dialectical, in the manner described, and then into eristical. (3) Eristic is the method by which the form of the conclusion is correct, but the premisses, the materials from which it is drawn, are not true, but only appear to be true.  Finally (4) Sophistic is the method in which the form of the conclusion is false, although it seems correct.  These three last properly belong to the art of Controversial Dialectic, as they have no objective truth in view, but only the appearance of it, and pay no regard to truth itself; that is to say, they aim at victory.  Aristotle’s book on Sophistic Conclusions was edited apart from the others, and at a later date.  It was the last book of his Dialectic.]

If the reader asks how this is, I reply that it is simply the natural baseness of human nature.  If human nature were not base, but thoroughly honourable, we should in every debate have no other aim than the discovery of truth; we should not in the least care whether the truth proved to be in favour of the opinion which we had begun by expressing, or of the opinion of our adversary.  That we should regard as a matter of no moment, or, at any rate, of very secondary consequence; but, as things are, it is the main concern.  Our innate vanity, which is particularly sensitive in reference to our intellectual powers, will not suffer us to allow that our first position was wrong and our adversary’s right.  The way out of this difficulty would be simply to take the trouble always to form a correct judgment.  For this a man would have to think before he spoke.  But, with most men, innate vanity is accompanied by loquacity and innate dishonesty.  They speak before they think; and even though they may afterwards perceive that they are wrong, and that what they assert is false, they want it to seem the contrary.  The interest in truth, which may be presumed to have been their only motive when they stated the proposition alleged to be true, now gives way to the interests of vanity:  and so, for the sake of vanity, what is true must seem false, and what is false must seem true.

However, this very dishonesty, this persistence in a proposition which seems false even to ourselves, has something to be said for it.  It often happens that we begin with the firm conviction of the truth of our statement; but our opponent’s argument appears to refute it.  Should we abandon our position at once, we may discover later on that we were right after all; the proof we offered was false, but nevertheless there was a proof for our statement which was true.  The argument which would have been our salvation did not occur to us at the moment.  Hence we make it a rule to attack a counter-argument, even though to all appearances it is true and forcible, in the belief that its truth is only superficial, and that in the course of the dispute another argument will occur to us by which we may upset it, or succeed in