associated Governments and other non-Russian Governments to be withdrawn from Russia and military assistance to cease to be given to antisoviet Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The soviet governments and the antisoviet governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing immediately after the signing of this agreement.  The conference to determine the most effective and just method of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous demobilization and also the withdrawal of the troops and the cessation of military assistance to the antisoviet governments.

7.  The allied and associated Governments, taking cognizance of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia, in its note of February 4, in regard to its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet governments and the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign States parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such States.  Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the present financial position of Russia.  The Russian gold seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany by the Allies to be regarded as partial payment of the portion of the debt due from the soviet republics of Russia.

     The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the
     foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April
     10, 1919.

In regard to the second sentence in paragraph 5, in regard to “giving help to Soviet Russia” I may say that I was told that that was not a sine qua non but it was necessary in order to get the proposal through the Russian executive committee, which it had to pass before it was handed to me.  I was also handed an additional sheet, which I refused to take as a part of the formal document, containing the following: 

The Soviet Government is most anxious to have a semiofficial guaranty from the American and British Governments that they will do their utmost to see to it that France lives up to the conditions of the armistice.

The Soviet Government had a deep suspicion of the French Government.

In reference to this matter, and in explanation of that proposal, I sent a number of telegrams from Helsingfors.  I feel that in a way it is important, for an explanation of the matter, that those telegrams should be made public, but, on the other hand, they were sent in a confidential code of the Department of State, and I do not feel at liberty to read them unless ordered to specifically by the committee.  I should not wish to take the responsibility for breaking a code which is in current use by the department.