effect of any large new accession to the ranks of any trade must, unless there is a corresponding growth of employment, bring down the rate of wages, whether these be fixed by a Trade Union standard or not.  Hence it is evident that any Trade Union would be bound to refuse admission to new applicants who, though they might be in other respects competent workmen, could not find work without under-bidding those who were at present occupied.  This they would do by reason of their standard wage qualification, for they would be able to show that the new applicants would not be competent to earn standard wages under the circumstances.  How far Trade Unions actually have conscious recourse to this method of limiting their numbers, may be doubted; but no one acquainted with the spirit of Trades Unions would believe that if a sudden growth of technical schools enabled large numbers of duly qualified youths to apply for admission into the various Unions so as to compete for the same quantity of work with the body of existing members, the Unions of the latter would freely and cheerfully admit them.  To do so would be suicidal, for no standard rate of wages could stand against the pressure of an increased supply of labour upon a fixed demand.  But it is not necessary to suppose that any considerable number of actually qualified workmen are refused admission to Trade Unions of skilled workers.  For the possession of the requisite skill, implying as it does a certain natural capacity, and an expenditure of time and money not within the power of the poorest classes, forms a practical limit to the number of applicants.  Moreover, in many trades, though by no means in all, restrictions are placed by the Unions upon the number of apprentices, with the object of limiting the number of those who should from year to year be qualified to compete for work.  In other trades where no rigid rule to this effect exists, there is an understanding which is equally effective.  Certain trades, such as the engineers, boiler-makers, and other branches of iron trade, place no restrictions, and in certain other trades the restrictions are not closely applied.  But most of the strong Trades Unions protect themselves in another way against the competition of unemployed.  By a System of “out of work” pay, they bribe those of their body, who from time to time are thrown out of work, not to underbid those in work, so as to bring down the rate of wages.  Several of the most important Unions pay large sums every year to “out of work” members.  By these three means, the “minimum wage” qualification for membership, the limitation of the number of apprentices, and the “out of work” fund, the Trade Unions strengthen the power of organized labour in skilled industries by restricting the competition of unemployed outsiders.