That all these economies are useful to the capitalists who form Trusts will be obvious.  How far they are socially useful is a more difficult question.  Reflection, however, will make one thing evident, viz. that though the public may share that part of the advantage derived from the more economical use of large capitals, it cannot share that portion which is derived from the absence of competition.  If two or more Trusts or aggregations of capital are still in actual or even in potential competition, the public will be enabled to reap what gain belongs to larger efficient production, for it will be for the interest of each severally to sell at the lowest prices; but if a single Trust rule the market, though the economic advantage of the Trust will be greater in so far as it escapes the labour of all competition, there will be no force to secure for the public any share in this advantage.  The advantageous position enjoyed by a Trust will certainly enable its owners at the same time to pay high profits, give high wages, and sell at low prices.  But while the force of self-interest will secure the first result, there is nothing to guarantee the second and third.  There is no adequate security that in the culminating product of capitalistic growth, the single dominant Trust or Syndicate self-interest will keep down prices, as is often urged by the advocates of Trust.  It is true that “they have a direct interest in keeping prices at least sufficiently low not to invite the organization of counter-enterprises which may destroy their existing profits."[39] But this consideration is qualified in two ways:—­a.  Where Trust is formed or assisted by the possession of a natural monopoly, i.e. land, or some content of land, absolutely limited in quality, such potential competition does not exist, and nothing, save the possibility of substituting another commodity, places a limit on the rise of price which a Trust may impose on the public..  Although the fear of potential competition will prevent the maintenance of an indefinitely high price it will not necessarily prevent such a rise of price as will yield enormous profits, and form a grievous burden on consumers.  For a strongly-constituted Trust will be able to crush any competing combination of ordinary size and strength by a temporary lowering of its prices below the margin of profitable production, the weapon which a strong rich company can always use successfully against a weaker new competitor.

But though a Trust with a really strong monopoly, and rid of all effective competition, will be able to impose exorbitant and oppressive prices on consumers, it must be observed that it is not necessarily to its interest to do so.  Every rise of price implies a fall off in quantity sold; and it may therefore pay a Trust better to sell a large quantity at a moderate profit than a smaller quantity at an enormous profit.  The exercise of the power possessed by the owners of a monopoly depends upon the proportionate effect a