government of this period bore the same stamp of miserable baseness.  In our case the accidental fact, that the war in Africa is brought nearer to us by means of better accounts than the other contemporary military and political events, shifts the true perspective; contemporaries learned by these revelations nothing but what everybody knew long before and every intrepid patriot had long been in a position to support by facts.  The circumstance, however, that they were now furnished with some fresh, still stronger and still more irrefutable, proofs of the baseness of the restored senatorial government—­a baseness only surpassed by its incapacity—­might have been of importance, had there been an opposition and a public opinion with which the government would have found it necessary to come to terms.  But this war had in fact exposed the corruption of the government no less than it had revealed the utter nullity of the opposition.  It was not possible to govern worse than the restoration governed in the years 637-645; it was not possible to stand forth more defenceless and forlorn than was the Roman senate in 645:  had there been in Rome a real opposition, that is to say, a party which wished and urged a fundamental alteration of the constitution, it must necessarily have now made at least an attempt to overturn the restored senate.  No such attempt took place; the political question was converted into a personal one, the generals were changed, and one or two useless and unimportant people were banished.  It was thus settled, that the so-called popular party as such neither could nor would govern; that only two forms of government were at all possible in Rome, a -tyrannis- or an oligarchy; that, so long as there happened to be nobody sufficiently well known, if not sufficiently important, to usurp the regency of the state, the worst mismanagement endangered at the most individual oligarchs, but never the oligarchy; that on the other hand, so soon as such a pretender appeared, nothing was easier than to shake the rotten curule chairs.  In this respect the coming forward of Marius was significant, just because it was in itself so utterly unwarranted.  If the burgesses had stormed the senate-house after the defeat of Albinus, it would have been a natural, not to say a proper course; but after the turn which Metellus had given to the Numidian war, nothing more could be said of mismanagement, and still less of danger to the commonwealth, at least in this respect; and yet the first ambitious officer who turned up succeeded in doing that with which the older Africanus had once threatened the government,(16) and procured for himself one of the principal military commands against the distinctly-expressed will of the governing body.  Public opinion, unavailing in the hands of the so-called popular party, became an irresistible weapon in the hands of the future king of Rome.  We do not mean to say that Marius intended to play the pretender, at least at the time