of Corinth, but the greater portion was declared to
be public land of Rome. Thus was extinguished
“the eye of Hellas,” the last precious
ornament of the Grecian land, once so rich in cities.
If, however, we review the whole catastrophe, the
impartial historian must acknowledge— what
the Greeks of this period themselves candidly confessed—that
the Romans were not to blame for the war itself, but
that on the contrary, the foolish perfidy and the
feeble temerity of the Greeks compelled the Roman
intervention. The abolition of the mock sovereignty
of the leagues and of all the vague and pernicious
dreams connected with them was a blessing for the
country; and the government of the Roman commander-in-chief
of Macedonia, however much it fell short of what was
to be wished, was yet far better than the previous
confusion and misrule of Greek confederacies and Roman
commissions. The Peloponnesus ceased to be the
great harbour of mercenaries; it is affirmed, and
may readily be believed, that with the direct government
of Rome security and prosperity in some measure returned.
The epigram of Themistocles, that ruin had averted
ruin, was applied by the Hellenes of that day not
altogether without reason to the loss of Greek independence.
The singular indulgence, which Rome even now showed
towards the Greeks, becomes fully apparent only when
compared with the contemporary conduct of the same
authorities towards the Spaniards and Phoenicians.
To treat barbarians with cruelty seemed not unallowable,
but the Romans of this period, like the emperor Trajan
in later times, deemed it “harsh and barbarous
to deprive Athens and Sparta of the shadow of freedom
which they still retained.” All the more
marked is the contrast between this general moderation
and the revolting treatment of Corinth—a
treatment disapproved by the orators who defended
the destruction of Numantia and Carthage, and far
from justified, even according to Roman international
law, by the abusive language uttered against the Roman
deputies in the streets of Corinth. And yet
it by no means proceeded from the brutality of any
single individual, least of all of Mummius, but was
a measure deliberated and resolved on by the Roman
senate. We shall not err, if we recognize it
as the work of the mercantile party, which even thus
early began to interfere in politics by the side of
the aristocracy proper, and which in destroying Corinth
got rid of a commercial rival. If the great
merchants of Rome had anything to say in the regulation
of Greece, we can understand why Corinth was singled
out for punishment, and why the Romans not only destroyed
the city as it stood, but also prohibited any future
settlement on a site so pre-eminently favourable for
commerce. The Peloponnesian Argos thenceforth
became the rendezvous for the Roman merchants, who
were very numerous even in Greece. For the Roman
wholesale traffic, however, Delos was of greater importance;
a Roman free port as early as 586, it had attracted
a great part of the business of Rhodes,(26) and now
in a similar way entered on the heritage of Corinth.
This island remained for a considerable time the
chief emporium for merchandise going from the east
to the west.(27)