and that it was absolutely impossible to revive the
gigantic plan of the patriot party. It might
seem little in the eyes of the vengeful Italians,
that only the five hundred surrendered ships of war
perished in the flames, and not the hated city itself;
spite and pedantry might contend for the view that
an opponent is only really vanquished when he is annihilated,
and might censure the man who had disdained to punish
more thoroughly the crime of having made Romans tremble.
Scipio thought otherwise; and we have no reason and
therefore no right to assume that the Roman was in
this instance influenced by vulgar motives rather
than by the noble and magnanimous impulses which formed
part of his character. It was not the consideration
of his own possible recall or of the mutability of
fortune, nor was it any apprehension of the outbreak
of a Macedonian war at certainly no distant date,
that prevented the self-reliant and confident hero,
with whom everything had hitherto succeeded beyond
belief, from accomplishing the destruction of the unhappy
city, which fifty years afterwards his adopted grandson
was commissioned to execute, and which might indeed
have been equally well accomplished now. It
is much more probable that the two great generals,
on whom the decision of the political question now
devolved, offered and accepted peace on such terms
in order to set just and reasonable limits on the
one hand to the furious vengeance of the victors, on
the other to the obstinacy and imprudence of the vanquished.
The noble-mindedness and statesmanlike gifts of the
great antagonists are no less apparent in the magnanimous
submission of Hannibal to what was inevitable, than
in the wise abstinence of Scipio from an extravagant
and insulting use of victory. Is it to be supposed
that one so generous, unprejudiced, and intelligent
should not have asked himself of what benefit it could
be to his country, now that the political power of
the Carthaginian city was annihilated, utterly to destroy
that ancient seat of commerce and of agriculture, and
wickedly to overthrow one of the main pillars of the
then existing civilization? The time had not
yet come when the first men of Rome lent themselves
to destroy the civilization of their neighbours, and
frivolously fancied that they could wash away from
themselves the eternal infamy of the nation by shedding
an idle tear.
Results of the War
Thus ended the second Punic or, as the Romans more correctly called it, the Hannibalic war, after it had devastated the lands and islands from the Hellespont to the Pillars of Hercules for seventeen years. Before this war the policy of the Romans had no higher aim than to acquire command of the mainland of the Italian peninsula within its natural boundaries, and of the Italian islands and seas; it is clearly proved by their treatment of Africa on the conclusion of peace that they also terminated the war with the impression, not that they had laid the foundation of sovereignty