went so far as to beg vessels of war from his ally
Prusias of Bithynia, and even from Hannibal.
It was only towards the close of the war that he resolved—as
he should have done at first—to order the
construction of 100 ships of war; of these however
no use was made, if the order was executed at all.
All who understood the position of Greece and sympathized
with it lamented the unhappy war, in which the last
energies of Greece preyed upon themselves and the
prosperity of the land was destroyed; repeatedly the
commercial states, Rhodes, Chios, Mitylene, Byzantium,
Athens, and even Egypt itself had attempted a mediation.
In fact both parties had an interest in coming to
terms. The Aetolians, to whom their Roman allies
attached the chief importance, had, like the Macedonians,
much to suffer from the war; especially after the petty
king of the Athamanes had been gained by Philip, and
the interior of Aetolia had thus been laid open to
Macedonian incursions. Many Aetolians too had
their eyes gradually opened to the dishonourable and
pernicious part which the Roman alliance condemned
them to play; a cry of horror pervaded the whole Greek
nation when the Aetolians in concert with the Romans
sold whole bodies of Hellenic citizens, such as those
of Anticyra, Oreus, Dyme, and Aegina, into slavery.
But the Aetolians were no longer free; they ran a
great risk if of their own accord they concluded peace
with Philip, and they found the Romans by no means
disposed, especially after the favourable turn which
matters were taking in Spain and in Italy, to desist
from a war, which on their part was carried on with
merely a few ships, and the burden and injury of which
fell mainly on the Aetolians. At length however
the Aetolians resolved to listen to the mediating cities:
and, notwithstanding the counter-efforts of the Romans,
a peace was arranged in the winter of 548-9 between
the Greek powers. Aetolia had converted an over-powerful
ally into a dangerous enemy; but the Roman senate,
which just at that time was summoning all the resources
of the exhausted state for the decisive expedition
to Africa, did not deem it a fitting moment to resent
the breach of the alliance. The war with Philip
could not, after the withdrawal of the Aetolians, have
been carried on by the Romans without considerable
exertions of their own; and it appeared to them more
convenient to terminate it also by a peace, whereby
the state of things before the war was substantially
restored and Rome in particular retained all her possessions
on the coast of Epirus except the worthless territory
of the Atintanes. Under the circumstances Philip
had to deem himself fortunate in obtaining such terms;
but the fact proclaimed—what could not indeed
be longer concealed—that all the unspeakable
misery which ten years of a warfare waged with revolting
inhumanity had brought upon Greece had been endured
in vain, and that the grand and just combination,
which Hannibal had projected and all Greece had for
a moment joined, was shattered irretrievably.