New War-like Preparations in Rome
Paullus and Varro

Despite all its misfortunes, Roman pride stood no less unshaken than the Roman symmachy.  The donations which were offered by king Hiero of Syracuse and the Greek cities in Italy for the next campaign—­the war affected the latter less severely than the other Italian allies of Rome, for they sent no contingents to the land army—­were declined with thanks; the chieftains of Illyria were informed that they could not be allowed to neglect payment of their tribute; and even the king of Macedonia was once more summoned to surrender Demetrius of Pharos.  The majority of the senate, notwithstanding the semblance of legitimation which recent events had given to the Fabian system of delay, had firmly resolved to depart from a mode of war that was slowly but certainly ruining the state; if the popular dictator had failed in his more energetic method of warfare, they laid the blame of the failure, and not without reason, on the fact that they had adopted a half-measure and had given him too few troops.  This error they determined to avoid and to equip an army, such as Rome had never sent out before—­eight legions, each raised a fifth above the normal strength, and a corresponding number of allies—­enough to crush an opponent who was not half so strong.  Besides this, a legion under the praetor Lucius Postumius was destined for the valley of the Po, in order, if possible, to draw off the Celts serving in the army of Hannibal to their homes.  These resolutions were judicious; everything depended on their coming to an equally judicious decision respecting the supreme command.  The stiff carriage of Quintus Fabius, and the attacks of the demagogues which it provoked, had rendered the dictatorship and the senate generally more unpopular than ever:  amongst the people, not without the connivance of their leaders, the foolish report circulated that the senate was intentionally prolonging the war.  As, therefore, the nomination of a dictator was not to be thought of, the senate attempted to procure the election of suitable consuls; but this only had the effect of thoroughly rousing suspicion and obstinacy.  With difficulty the senate carried one of its candidates, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who had with judgment conducted the Illyrian war in 535;(5) an immense majority of the citizens assigned to him as colleague the candidate of the popular party, Gaius Terentius Varro, an incapable man, who was known only by his bitter opposition to the senate and more especially as the main author of the proposal to elect Marcus Minucius co-dictator, and who was recommended to the multitude solely by his humble birth and his coarse effrontery.

Battle at Cannae