fashion, with constant changes in the plan and in the theatre of operations; and that its favourable issue could only be looked for as the result of political and not of military successes—­of the gradual loosening and final breaking up of the Italian federation.  That mode of carrying on the war was necessary, because the single element which Hannibal had to throw into the scale against so many disadvantages—­his military genius—­only told with its full weight, when he constantly foiled his opponents by unexpected combinations; he was undone, if the war became stationary.  That aim was the aim dictated to him by right policy, because, mighty conqueror though he was in battle, he saw very clearly that on each occasion he vanquished the generals and not the city, and that after each new battle the Romans remained just as superior to the Carthaginians as he was personally superior to the Roman commanders.  That Hannibal even at the height of his fortune never deceived himself on this point, is worthier of admiration than his most admired battles.

Hannibal Crosses the Apennines

It was these motives, and not the entreaties of the Gauls that he should spare their country—­which would not have influenced him—­that induced Hannibal now to forsake, as it were, his newly acquired basis of operations against Italy, and to transfer the scene of war to Italy itself.  Before doing so he gave orders that all the prisoners should be brought before him.  He ordered the Romans to be separated and loaded with chains as slaves—­the statement that Hannibal put to death all the Romans capable of bearing arms, who here and elsewhere fell into his hands, is beyond doubt at least strongly exaggerated.  On the other hand, all the Italian allies were released without ransom, and charged to report at home that Hannibal waged war not against Italy, but against Rome; that he promised to every Italian community the restoration of its ancient independence and its ancient boundaries; and that the deliverer was about to follow those whom he had set free, bringing release and revenge.  In fact, when the winter ended, he started from the valley of the Po to search for a route through the difficult defiles of the Apennines.  Gaius Flaminius, with the Etruscan army, was still for the moment at Arezzo, intending to move from that point towards Lucca in order to protect the vale of the Arno and the passes of the Apennines, so soon as the season should allow.  But Hannibal anticipated him.  The passage of the Apennines was accomplished without much difficulty, at a point as far west as possible or, in other words, as distant as possible from the enemy; but the marshy low grounds between the Serchio and the Arno were so flooded by the melting of the snow and the spring rains, that the army had to march four days in water, without finding any other dry spot for resting by night than was supplied by piling the baggage or by the sumpter animals that had fallen.