a separate peace with Pyrrhus. The object of
the Romans in entering into the treaty was to render
possible an attack on Tarentum and to cut off Pyrrhus
from his own country, neither of which ends could be
attained without the co-operation of the Punic fleet;
the object of the Carthaginians was to detain the
king in Italy, so that they might be able without
molestation to carry into effect their designs on Syracuse.(5)
It was accordingly the interest of both powers in
the first instance to secure the sea between Italy
and Sicily. A powerful Carthaginian fleet of
120 sail under the admiral Mago proceeded from Ostia,
whither Mago seems to have gone to conclude the treaty,
to the Sicilian straits. The Mamertines, who
anticipated righteous punishment for their outrage
upon the Greek population of Messana in the event of
Pyrrhus becoming ruler of Sicily and Italy, attached
themselves closely to the Romans and Carthaginians,
and secured for them the Sicilian side of the straits.
The allies would willingly have brought Rhegium also
on the opposite coast under their power; but Rome could
not possibly pardon the Campanian garrison, and an
attempt of the combined Romans and Carthaginians to
gain the city by force of arms miscarried. The
Carthaginian fleet sailed thence for Syracuse and
blockaded the city by sea, while at the same time a
strong Phoenician army began the siege by land (476).
It was high time that Pyrrhus should appear at Syracuse:
but, in fact, matters in Italy were by no means in
such a condition that he and his troops could be dispensed
with there. The two consuls of 476, Gaius Fabricius
Luscinus, and Quintus Aemilius Papus, both experienced
generals, had begun the new campaign with vigour,
and although the Romans had hitherto sustained nothing
but defeat in this war, it was not they but the victors
that were weary of it and longed for peace.
Pyrrhus made another attempt to obtain accommodation
on tolerable terms. The consul Fabricius had
handed over to the king a wretch, who had proposed
to poison him on condition of being well paid for
it. Not only did the king in token of gratitude
release all his Roman prisoners without ransom, but
he felt himself so moved by the generosity of his
brave opponents that he offered, by way of personal
recompense, a singularly fair and favourable peace.
Cineas appears to have gone once more to Rome, and
Carthage seems to have been seriously apprehensive
that Rome might come to terms. But the senate
remained firm, and repeated its former answer.
Unless the king was willing to allow Syracuse to fall
into the hands of the Carthaginians and to have his
grand scheme thereby disconcerted, no other course
remained than to abandon his Italian allies and to
confine himself for the time being to the occupation
of the most important seaports, particularly Tarentum
and Locri. In vain the Lucanians and Samnites
conjured him not to desert them; in vain the Tarentines
summoned him either to comply with his duty as their
general or to give them back their city. The
king met their complaints and reproaches with the
consolatory assurance that better times were coming,
or with abrupt dismissal. Milo remained behind
in Tarentum; Alexander, the king’s son, in Locri;
and Pyrrhus, with his main force, embarked in the
spring of 476 at Tarentum for Syracuse.