was left behind in Lissus; all possibility of bringing up fresh reinforcements to Caesar by sea from Brundisium was thus lost.  The numerous Pompeian cavalry, now released from their confinement, poured themselves over the adjacent country and threatened to render the provisioning of Caesar’s army, which had always been difficult, utterly impossible.  Caesar’s daring enterprise of carrying on offensive operations without ships against an enemy in command of the sea and resting on his fleet had totally failed.  On what had hitherto been the theatre of war he found himself in presence of an impregnable defensive position, and unable to strike a serious blow either against Dyrrhachium or against the hostile army; on the other hand it depended now solely on Pompeius whether he should proceed to attack under the most favourable circumstances an antagonist already in grave danger as to his means of subsistence.  The war had arrived at a crisis.  Hitherto Pompeius had, to all appearance, played the game of war without special plan, and only adjusted his defence according to the exigencies of each attack; and this was not to be censured, for the protraction of the war gave him opportunity of making his recruits capable of fighting, of bringing up his reserves, and of bringing more fully into play the superiority of his fleet in the Adriatic.  Caesar was beaten not merely in tactics but also in strategy.  This defeat had not, it is true, that effect which Pompeius not without reason expected; the eminent soldierly energy of Caesar’s veterans did not allow matters to come to an immediate and total breaking up of the army by hunger and mutiny.  But yet it seemed as if it depended solely on his opponent by judiciously following up his victory to reap its full fruits.

War Prospects of Pompeius
Scipio and Calvinus

It was for Pompeius to assume the aggressive; and he was resolved to do so.  Three different ways of rendering his victory fruitful presented themselves to him.  The first and simplest was not to desist from assailing the vanquished army, and, if it departed, to pursue it.  Secondly, Pompeius might leave Caesar himself and his best troops in Greece, and might cross in person, as he had long been making preparations for doing, with the main army to Italy, where the feeling was decidedly antimonarchical and the forces of Caesar, after the despatch of the best troops and their brave and trustworthy commandant to the Greek army, would not be of very much moment.  Lastly, the victor might turn inland, effect a junction with the legions of Metellus Scipio, and attempt to capture the troops of Caesar stationed in the interior.  The latter forsooth had, immediately after the arrival of the second freight from Italy, on the one hand despatched strong detachments to Aetolia and Thessaly to procure means of subsistence for his army, and on the other had ordered a corps of two legions under Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus to advance on the Egnatian