and to colonize them, so far as they were not Hellenic—­had already in the Gracchan age been practically recognized by the annexation of the kingdom of Attalus and by the Transalpine conquests of Flaccus:  but the prevailing reaction once more arrested their application.  The Roman state remained a chaotic mass of countries without thorough occupation and without proper limits.  Spain and the Graeco-Asiatic possessions were separated from the mother country by wide territories, of which barely the borders along the coast were subject to the Romans; on the north coast of Africa the domains of Carthage and Cyrene alone were occupied like oases; large tracts even of the subject territory, especially in Spain, were but nominally subject to the Romans.  Absolutely nothing was done on the part of the government towards concentrating and rounding off their dominion, and the decay of the fleet seemed at length to dissolve the last bond of connection between the distant possessions.  The democracy no doubt attempted, so soon as it again raised its head, to shape its external policy in the spirit of Gracchus—­Marius in particular cherished such ideas—­but as it did not for any length of time attain the helm, its projects were left unfulfilled.  It was not till the democracy practically took in hand the government on the overthrow of the Sullan constitution in 684, that a revolution in this respect occurred.  First of all their sovereignty on the Mediterranean was restored—­the most vital question for a state like that of Rome.  Towards the east, moreover, the boundary of the Euphrates was secured by the annexation of the provinces of Pontus and Syria.  But there still remained beyond the Alps the task of at once rounding off the Roman territory towards the north and west, and of gaining a fresh virgin soil there for Hellenic civilization and for the yet unbroken vigour of the Italic race.

Historical Significance of the Conquests of Caesar

This task Gaius Caesar undertook.  It is more than an error, it is an outrage upon the sacred spirit dominant in history, to regard Gaul solely as the parade ground on which Caesar exercised himself and his legions for the impending civil war.  Though the subjugation of the west was for Caesar so far a means to an end that he laid the foundations of his later height of power in the Transalpine wars, it is the especial privilege of a statesman of genius that his means themselves are ends in their turn.  Caesar needed no doubt for his party aims a military power, but he did not conquer Gaul as a partisan.  There was a direct political necessity for Rome to meet the perpetually threatened invasion of the Germans thus early beyond the Alps, and to construct a rampart there which should secure the peace of the Roman world.  But even this important object was not the highest and ultimate reason for which Gaul was conquered by Caesar.  When the old home had become too narrow for the Roman burgesses and they were in danger of