Mithradates

King Mithradates acted with greater moderation.  He refrained from aggressions in Asia Minor, and contented himself with—­ what no treaty forbade—­placing his dominion along the Black Sea ona firmer basis, and gradually bringing into more definite dependence the regions which separated the Bosporan kingdom, now ruled under his supremacy by his son Machares, from that of Pontus.  But he too applied every effort to render his fleet and army efficient, and especially to arm and organize the latter after the Roman model; in which the Roman emigrants, who sojourned in great numbers at his court, rendered essential service.

Demeanor of the Romans in the East
Egypt not Annexed

The Romans had no desire to become further involved in Oriental affairs than they were already.  This appears with striking clearness in the fact, that the opportunity, which at this time presented itself, of peacefully bringing the kingdom of Egypt under the immediate dominion of Rome was spurned by the senate.  The legitimate descendants of Ptolemaeus son of Lagus had come to an end, when the king installed by Sulla after the death of Ptolemaeus Soter ii Lathyrus—­Alexander ii, a son of Alexander I—­was killed, a few days after he had ascended the throne, on occasion of a tumult in the capital (673).  This Alexander had in his testament(8) appointed the Roman community his heir.  The genuineness of this document was no doubt disputed; but the senate acknowledged it by assuming in virtue of it the sums deposited in Tyre on account of the deceased king.  Nevertheless it allowed two notoriously illegitimate sons of king Lathyrus, Ptolemaeus xi, who was styled the new Dionysos or the Flute-blower (Auletes), and Ptolemaeus the Cyprian, to take practical possession of Egypt and Cyprus respectively.  They were not indeed expressly recognized by the senate, but no distinct summons to surrender their kingdoms was addressed to them.  The reason why the senate allowed this state of uncertainty to continue, and did not commit itself to a definite renunciation of Egypt and Cyprus, was undoubtedly the considerable rent which these kings, ruling as it were on sufferance, regularly paid for the continuance of the uncertainty to the heads of the Roman coteries.  But the motive for waiving that attractive acquisition altogether was different.  Egypt, by its peculiar position and its financial organization, placed in the hands of any governor commanding it a pecuniary and naval power and generally an independent authority, which were absolutely incompatible with the suspicious and feeble government of the oligarchy:  in this point of view it was judicious to forgo the direct possession of the country of the Nile.

Non-Intervention in Asia Minor and Syria