Collapse of the Power of Sertorius

But this comparison was more ingenious than accurate.  Sertorius was far from being strong enough to renew the gigantic enterprise of Hannibal.  He was lost if he left Spain, where all his successes were bound up with the peculiarities of the country and the people; and even there he was more and more compelled to renounce the offensive.  His admirable skill as a leader could not change the nature of his troops.  The Spanish militia retained its character, untrustworthy as the wave or the wind; now collected in masses to the number of 150,000, now melting away again to a mere handful.  The Roman emigrants, likewise, continued insubordinate, arrogant, and stubborn.  Those kinds of armed force which require that a corps should keep together for a considerable time, such as cavalry especially, were of course very inadequately represented in his army.  The war gradually swept off his ablest officers and the flower of his veterans; and even the most trustworthy communities, weary of being harassed by the Romans and maltreated by the Sertorian officers, began to show signs of impatience and wavering allegiance.  It is remarkable that Sertorius, in this respect also like Hannibal, never deceived himself as to the hopelessness of his position; he allowed no opportunity for bringing about a compromise to pass, and would have been ready at any moment to lay down his staff of command on the assurance of being allowed to live peacefully in his native land.  But political orthodoxy knows nothing of compromise and conciliation.  Sertorius might not recede or step aside; he was compelled inevitably to move on along the path which he had once entered, however narrow and giddy it might become.

The representations which Pompeius addressed to Rome, and which derived emphasis from the behaviour of Mithradates in the east, were successful.  He had the necessary supplies of money sent to him by the senate and was reinforced by two fresh legions.  Thus the two generals went to work again in the spring of 680 and once more crossed the Ebro.  Eastern Spain was wrested from the Sertorians in consequence of the battles on the Xucar and Guadalaviar; the struggle thenceforth became concentrated on the upper and middle Ebro around the chief strongholds of the Sertorians—­Calagurris, Osca, Ilerda.  As Metellus had done best in the earlier campaigns, so too on this occasion he gained the most important successes.  His old opponent Hirtuleius, who again confronted him, was completely defeated and fell himself along with his brother—­an irreparable loss for the Sertorians.  Sertorius, whom the unfortunate news reached just as he was on the point of assailing the enemy opposed to him, cut down the messenger, that the tidings might not discourage his troops; but the news could not be long concealed.  One town after another surrendered, Metellus occupied the Celtiberian towns of Segobriga (between Toledo and Cuenca) and Bilbilis (near Calatayud).  Pompeius