were not ready to sail, so that the first freight was landed without hindrance.  While the vessels at once returned to bring over the second, Caesar on that same evening scaled the Acroceraunian mountains.  His first successes were as great as the surprise of his enemies.  The Epirot militia nowhere offered resistance; the important seaport towns of Oricum and Apollonia along with a number of smaller townships were taken, and Dyrrhachium, selected by the Pompeians as their chief arsenal and filled with stores of all sorts, but only feebly garrisoned, was in the utmost danger.

Caesar Cut Off from Italy

But the further course of the campaign did not correspond to this brilliant beginning.  Bibulus subsequently made up in some measure for the negligence, of which he had allowed himself to be guilty, by redoubling his exertions.  He not only captured nearly thirty of the transports returning home, and caused them with every living thing on board to be burnt, but he also established along the whole district of coast occupied by Caesar, from the island Sason (Saseno) as far as the ports of Corcyra, a most careful watch, however troublesome it was rendered by the inclement season of the year and the necessity of bringing everything necessary for the guard-ships, even wood and water, from Corcyra; in fact his successor Libo—­for he himself soon succumbed to the unwonted fatigues—­even blockaded for a time the port of Brundisium, till the want of water again dislodged him from the little island in front of it on which he had established himself.  It was not possible for Caesar’s officers to convey the second portion of the army over to their general.  As little did he himself succeed in the capture of Dyrrhachium.  Pompeius learned through one of Caesar’s peace envoys as to his preparations for the voyage to the Epirot coast, and, thereupon accelerating his march, threw himself just at the right time into that important arsenal.  The situation of Caesar was critical.  Although he extended his range in Epirus as far as with his slight strength was at all possible, the subsistence of his army remained difficult and precarious, while the enemy, in possession of the magazines of Dyrrhachium and masters of the sea, had abundance of everything.  With his army presumably little above 20,000 strong he could not offer battle to that of Pompeius at least twice as numerous, but had to deem himself fortunate that Pompeius went methodically to work and, instead of immediately forcing a battle, took up his winter quarters between Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the right bank of the Apsus, facing Caesar on the left, in order that after the arrival of the legions from Pergamus in the spring he might annihilate the enemy with an irresistibly superior force.  Thus months passed.  If the arrival of the better season, which brought to the enemy a strong additional force and the free use of his fleet, found Caesar still in the same position, he was to all appearance