The military support, which Pompeius and Crassus required for regulating the affairs of the capital all the more that the legions of Caesar originally destined for this purpose could not now be withdrawn from Transalpine Gaul, was to be found in new legions, which they were to raise for the Spanish and Syrian armies and were not to despatch from Italy to their several destinations until it should seem to themselves convenient to do so.  The main questions were thus settled; subordinate matters, such as the settlement of the tactics to be followed against the opposition in the capital, the regulation of the candidatures for the ensuing years, and the like, did not long detain them.  The great master of mediation composed the personal differences which stood in the way of an agreement with his wonted ease, and compelled the most refractory elements to act in concert.  An understanding befitting colleagues was reestablished, externally at least, between Pompeius and Crassus.  Even Publius Clodius was induced to keep himself and his pack quiet, and to give no farther annoyance to Pompeius—­not the least marvellous feat of the mighty magician.

Designs of Caesar in This Arrangement

That this whole settlement of the pending questions proceeded, not from a compromise among independent and rival regents meeting on equal terms, but solely from the good will of Caesar, is evident from the circumstances.  Pompeius appeared at Luca in the painful position of a powerless refugee, who comes to ask aid from his opponent.  Whether Caesar chose to dismiss him and to declare the coalition dissolved, or to receive him and to let the league continue just as it stood—­Pompeius was in either view politically annihilated.  If he did not in this case break with Caesar, he became the powerless client of his confederate.  If on the other hand he did break with Caesar and, which was not very probable, effected even now a coalition with the aristocracy, this alliance between opponents, concluded under pressure of necessity and at the last moment, was so little formidable that it was hardly for the sake of averting it that Caesar agreed to those concessions.  A serious rivalry on the part of Crassus with Caesar was utterly impossible.  It is difficult to say what motives induced Caesar to surrender without necessity his superior position, and now voluntarily to concede—­what he had refused to his rival even on the conclusion of the league of 694, and what the latter had since, with the evident design of being armed against Caesar, vainly striven in different ways to attain without, nay against, Caesar’s will—­the second consulate and military power.  Certainly it was not Pompeius alone that was placed at the head of an army, but also his old enemy and Caesar’s ally throughout many years, Crassus; and undoubtedly Crassus obtained his respectable military position merely as a counterpoise to the new power of Pompeius.  Nevertheless Caesar was a great loser, when his rival