Philosophy

Philosophy, in fine, was not yet represented in literature, since neither did an inward need develop a national Roman philosophy nor did outward circumstances call forth a Latin philosophical authorship.  It cannot even be shown with certainty that there were Latin translations of popular summaries of philosophy belonging to this period; those who pursued philosophy read and disputed in Greek.

Professional Sciences
Jurisprudence

In the professional sciences there was but little activity.  Well as the Romans understood how to farm and how to calculate, physical and mathematical research gained no hold among them.  The consequences of neglecting theory appeared practically in the low state of medical knowledge and of a portion of the military sciences.  Of all the professional sciences jurisprudence alone was flourishing.  We cannot trace its internal development with chronological accuracy.  On the whole ritual law fell more and more into the shade, and at the end of this period stood nearly in the same position as the canon law at the present day.  The finer and more profound conception of law, on the other hand, which substitutes for outward criteria the motive springs of action within—­such as the development of the ideas of offences arising from intention and from carelessness respectively, and of possession entitled to temporary protection—­was not yet in existence at the time of the Twelve Tables, but was so in the age of Cicero, and probably owed its elaboration substantially to the present epoch.  The reaction of political relations on the development of law has been already indicated on several occasions; it was not always advantageous.  By the institution of the tribunal of the -Centumviri- to deal with inheritance,(38) for instance, there was introduced in the law of property a college of jurymen, which, like the criminal authorities, instead of simply applying the law placed itself above it and with its so-called equity undermined the legal institutions; one consequence of which among others was the irrational principle, that any one, whom a relative had passed over in his testament, was at liberty to propose that the testament should be annulled by the court, and the court decided according to its discretion.

The development of juristic literature admits of being more distinctly recognized.  It had hitherto been restricted to collections of formularies and explanations of terms in the laws; at this period there was first formed a literature of opinions (-responsa-), which answers nearly to our modern collections of precedents.  These opinions—­which were delivered no longer merely by members of the pontifical college, but by every one who found persons to consult him, at home or in the open market-place, and with which were already associated rational and polemical illustrations and the standing controversies peculiar to jurisprudence—­began to be noted down and to be promulgated in collections about the beginning