So Hannibal collected the troops, destined for the grand army, in Cartagena at the beginning of the favourable season; there were 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, of whom about two-thirds were Africans and a third Spaniards.  The 37 elephants which they took with them were probably destined rather to make an impression on the Gauls than for serious warfare.  Hannibal’s infantry no longer needed, like that led by Xanthippus, to shelter itself behind a screen of elephants, and the general had too much sagacity to employ otherwise than sparingly and with caution that two-edged weapon, which had as often occasioned the defeat of its own as of the enemy’s army.  With this force the general set out in the spring of 536 from Cartagena towards the Ebro.  He so far informed his soldiers as to the measures which he had taken, particularly as to the connections he had entered into with the Celts and the resources and object of the expedition, that even the common soldier, whose military instincts lengthened war had developed, felt the clear perception and the steady hand of his leader, and followed him with implicit confidence to the unknown and distant land; and the fervid address, in which he laid before them the position of their country and the demands of the Romans, the slavery certainly reserved for their dear native land, and the disgrace of the imputation that they could surrender their beloved general and his staff, kindled a soldierly and patriotic ardour in the hearts of all.

Position of Rome
Their Uncertain Plans for War

The Roman state was in a plight, such as may occur even in firmly-established and sagacious aristocracies.  The Romans knew doubtless what they wished to accomplish, and they took various steps; but nothing was done rightly or at the right time.  They might long ago have been masters of the gates of the Alps and have settled matters with the Celts; the latter were still formidable, and the former were open.  They might either have had friendship, with Carthage, had they honourably kept the peace of 513, or, had they not been disposed for peace, they might long ago have conquered Cartilage:  the peace was practically broken by the seizure of Sardinia, and they allowed the power of Carthage to recover itself undisturbed for twenty years.  There was no great difficulty in maintaining peace with Macedonia; but they had forfeited her friendship for a trifling gain.  There must have been a lack of some leading statesman to take a connected and commanding view of the position of affairs; on all hands either too little was done, or too much.  Now the war began at a time and at a place which they had allowed the enemy to determine; and, with all their well-founded conviction of military superiority, they were perplexed as to the object to be aimed at and the course to be followed in their first operations.  They had at their disposal more than half a million of serviceable soldiers; the Roman cavalry alone was less good, and relatively