of taxes. The hateful severity of the father
thus not only yielded benefit, but conciliated affection,
to the son. Twenty-six years of peace had partly
of themselves filled up the blanks in the Macedonian
population, partly given opportunity to the government
to take serious steps towards rectifying this which
was really the weak point of the land. Philip
urged the Macedonians to marry and raise up children;
he occupied the coast towns, whose inhabitants he
carried into the interior, with Thracian colonists
of trusty valour and fidelity. He formed a barrier
on the north to check once for all the desolating
incursions of the Dardani, by converting the space
intervening between the Macedonian frontier and the
barbarian territory into a desert, and by founding
new towns in the northern provinces. In short
he took step by step the same course in Macedonia,
as Augustus afterwards took when he laid afresh the
foundations of the Roman empire. The army was
numerous—30,000 men without reckoning contingents
and hired troops—and the younger men were
well exercised in the constant border warfare with
the Thracian barbarians. It is strange that
Philip did not try, like Hannibal, to organize his
army after the Roman fashion; but we can understand
it when we recollect the value which the Macedonians
set upon their phalanx, often conquered, but still
withal believed to be invincible. Through the
new sources of revenue which Philip had created in
mines, customs, and tenths, and through the flourishing
state of agriculture and commerce, he had succeeded
in replenishing his treasury, granaries, and arsenals.
When the war began, there was in the Macedonian treasury
money enough to pay the existing army and 10,000 hired
troops for ten years, and there were in the public
magazines stores of grain for as long a period (18,000,000
medimni or 27,000,000 bushels), and arms for an army
of three times the strength of the existing one.
In fact, Macedonia had become a very different state
from what it was when surprised by the outbreak of
the second war with Rome. The power of the kingdom
was in all respects at least doubled: with a
power in every point of view far inferior Hannibal
had been able to shake Rome to its foundations.
Attempted Coalition against Rome
Its external relations were not in so favourable a
position. The nature of the case required that
Macedonia should now take up the plans of Hannibal
and Antiochus, and should try to place herself at
the head of a coalition of all oppressed states against
the supremacy of Rome; and certainly threads of intrigue
ramified in all directions from the court of Pydna.
But their success was slight. It was indeed
asserted that the allegiance of the Italians was wavering;
but neither friend nor foe could fail to see that
an immediate resumption of the Samnite wars was not
at all probable. The nocturnal conferences likewise
between Macedonian deputies and the Carthaginian senate,