was by no means fitted to allay.  Both sides, however, displayed wisdom enough not to push matters too far.  The senate itself could not fail to see that the African expedition was necessary, and that it was not wise indefinitely to postpone it; it could not fail to see that Scipio was an extremely able officer and so far well adapted to be the leader in such a war, and that he, if any one, could prevail on the people to protract his command as long as was necessary and to put forth their last energies.  The majority came to the resolution not to refuse to Scipio the desired commission, after he had previously observed, at least in form, the respect due to the supreme governing board and had submitted himself beforehand to the decree of the senate.  Scipio was to proceed this year to Sicily to superintend the building of the fleet, the preparation of siege materials, and the formation of the expeditionary army, and then in the following year to land in Africa.  For this purpose the army of Sicily—­still composed of those two legions that were formed from the remnant of the army of Cannae—­was placed at his disposal, because a weak garrison and the fleet were quite sufficient for the protection of the island; and he was permitted moreover to raise volunteers in Italy.  It was evident that the senate did not appoint the expedition, but merely allowed it:  Scipio did not obtain half the resources which had formerly been placed at the command of Regulus, and he got that very corps which for years had been subjected by the senate to intentional degradation.  The African army was, in the view of the majority of the senate, a forlorn hope of disrated companies and volunteers, the loss of whom in any event the state had no great occasion to regret.

Any one else than Scipio would perhaps have declared that the African expedition must either be undertaken with other means, or not at all; but Scipio’s confidence accepted the terms, whatever they were, solely with the view of attaining the eagerly-coveted command.  He carefully avoided, as far as possible, the imposition of direct burdens on the people, that he might not injure the popularity of the expedition.  Its expenses, particularly those of building the fleet which were considerable, were partly procured by what was termed a voluntary contribution of the Etruscan cities—­that is, by a war tribute imposed as a punishment on the Arretines and other communities disposed to favour the Phoenicians—­partly laid upon the cities of Sicily.  In forty days the fleet was ready for sea.  The crews were reinforced by volunteers, of whom seven thousand from all parts of Italy responded to the call of the beloved officer.  So Scipio set sail for Africa in the spring of 550 with two strong legions of veterans (about 30,000 men), 40 vessels of war, and 400 transports, and landed successfully, without meeting the slightest resistance, at the Fair Promontory in the neighbourhood of Utica.