thus furnishing a demonstration, very inconvenient
for himself, of the small value of the liberty and
sovereignty which had just been solemnly assured to
the Campanians by the Carthaginian general. On
the other hand, the south Italian Greeks adhered to
the Roman alliance—a result to which the
Roman garrisons no doubt contributed, but which was
still more due to the very decided dislike of the
Hellenes towards the Phoenicians themselves and towards
their new Lucanian and Bruttian allies, and their
attachment on the other hand to Rome, which had zealously
embraced every opportunity of manifesting its Hellenism,
and had exhibited towards the Greeks in Italy an unwonted
gentleness. Thus the Campanian Greeks, particularly
Neapolis, courageously withstood the attack of Hannibal
in person: in Magna Graecia Rhegium, Thurii,
Metapontum, and Tarentum did the same notwithstanding
their very perilous position. Croton and Locri
on the other hand were partly carried by storm, partly
forced to capitulate, by the united Phoenicians and
Bruttians; and the citizens of Croton were conducted
to Locri, while Bruttian colonists occupied that important
naval station. The Latin colonies in southern
Italy, such as Brundisium, Venusia, Paesturn, Cosa,
and Cales, of course maintained unshaken fidelity
to Rome. They were the strongholds by which the
conquerors held in check a foreign land, settled on
the soil of the surrounding population, and at feud
with their neighbours; they, too, would be the first
to be affected, if Hannibal should keep his word and
restore to every Italian community its ancient boundaries.
This was likewise the case with all central Italy,
the earliest seat of the Roman rule, where Latin manners
and language already everywhere preponderated, and
the people felt themselves to be the comrades rather
than the subjects of their rulers. The opponents
of Hannibal in the Carthaginian senate did not fail
to appeal to the fact that not one Roman citizen or
one Latin community had cast itself into the arms
of Carthage. This groundwork of the Roman power
could only be broken up, like the Cyclopean walls,
stone by stone.
Attitude of the Romans
Such were the consequences of the day of Cannae, in
which the flower of the soldiers and officers of the
confederacy, a seventh of the whole number of Italians
capable of bearing arms, perished. It was a
cruel but righteous punishment for the grave political
errors with which not merely some foolish or miserable
individuals, but the Roman people themselves, were
justly chargeable. A constitution adapted for
a small country town was no longer suitable for a great
power; it was simply impossible that the question
as to the leadership of the armies of the city in
such a war should be left year after year to be decided
by the Pandora’s box of the balloting-urn.
As a fundamental revision of the constitution, if
practicable at all, could not at least be undertaken
now, the practical superintendence of the war, and