necessarily patricians, the tribunes necessarily plebeians.  The former had the ampler power, the latter the more unlimited, for the consul submitted to the prohibition and the judgment of the tribunes, but the tribune did not submit himself to the consul.  Thus the tribunician power was a copy of the consular; but it was none the less a contrast to it.  The power of the consuls was essentially positive, that of the tribunes essentially negative.  The consuls alone were magistrates of the Roman people, not the tribunes; for the former were elected by the whole burgesses, the latter only by the plebeian association.  In token of this the consul appeared in public with the apparel and retinue pertaining to state-officials; the tribunes sat on a stool instead of the “chariot seat,” and lacked the official attendants, the purple border, and generally all the insignia of magistracy:  even in the senate the tribune had neither presidency nor so much as a seat.  Thus in this remarkable institution absolute prohibition was in the most stern and abrupt fashion opposed to absolute command; the quarrel was settled by legally recognizing and regulating the discord between rich and poor.

Political Value of the Tribunate

But what was gained by a measure which broke up the unity of the state; which subjected the magistrates to a controlling authority unsteady in its action and dependent on all the passions of the moment; which in the hour of peril might have brought the administration to a dead-lock at the bidding of any one of the opposition chiefs elevated to the rival throne; and which, by investing all the magistrates with co-ordinate jurisdiction in the administration of criminal law, as it were formally transferred that administration from the domain of law to that of politics and corrupted it for all time coming?  It is true indeed that the tribunate, if it did not directly contribute to the political equalization of the orders, served as a powerful weapon in the hands of the plebeians when these soon afterwards desired admission to the offices of state.  But this was not the real design of the tribunate.  It was a concession wrung not from the politically privileged order, but from the rich landlords and capitalists; it was designed to ensure to the commons equitable administration of law, and to promote a more judicious administration of finance.  This design it did not, and could not, fulfil.  The tribune might put a stop to particular iniquities, to individual instances of crying hardship; but the fault lay not in the unfair working of a righteous law, but in a law which was itself unrighteous, and how could the tribune regularly obstruct the ordinary course of justice?  Could he have done so, it would have served little to remedy the evil, unless the sources of impoverishment were stopped—­the perverse taxation, the wretched system of credit, and the pernicious occupation of the domain-lands.  But such measures were not