even against the nobility, the consul—ruling
for a brief term, but before and after that term simply
one of the nobility, and obeying to-morrow the noble
fellow-burgess whom he had commanded to-day—by
no means occupied a position aloof from his order,
and the spirit of the noble in him must have been far
more powerful than that of the magistrate. Indeed,
if at any time by way of exception a patrician disinclined
to the rule of the nobility was called to the government,
his official authority was paralyzed partly by the
priestly colleges, which were pervaded by an intense
aristocratic spirit, partly by his colleague, and was
easily suspended by the dictatorship; and, what was
of still more moment, he wanted the first element
of political power, time. The president of a
commonwealth, whatever plenary authority may be conceded
to him, will never gain possession of political power,
if he does not continue for some considerable time
at the head of affairs; for a necessary condition
of every dominion is duration. Consequently the
senate appointed for life inevitably acquired—and
that by virtue chiefly of its title to advise the
magistrate in all points, so that we speak not of
the narrower patrician, but of the enlarged patricio-plebeian,
senate—so great an influence as contrasted
with the annual rulers, that their legal relations
became precisely inverted; the senate substantially
assumed to itself the powers of government, and the
former ruler sank into a president acting as its chairman
and executing its decrees. In the case of every
proposal to be submitted to the community for acceptance
or rejection the practice of previously consulting
the whole senate and obtaining its approval, while
not constitutionally necessary, was consecrated by
use and wont; and it was not lightly or willingly
departed from. The same course was followed
in the case of important state-treaties, of the management
and distribution of the public lands, and generally
of every act the effects of which extended beyond
the official year; and nothing was left to the consul
but the transaction of current business, the initial
steps in civil processes, and the command in war.
Especially important in its consequences was the change
in virtue of which neither the consul, nor even the
otherwise absolute dictator, was permitted to touch
the public treasure except with the consent and by
the will of the senate. The senate made it obligatory
on the consuls to commit the administration of the
public chest, which the king had managed or might
at any rate have managed himself, to two standing
subordinate magistrates, who were nominated no doubt
by the consuls and had to obey them, but were, as
may easily be conceived, much more dependent than
the consuls themselves on the senate.(16) It thus
drew into its own hands the management of finance;
and this right of sanctioning the expenditure of money
on the part of the Roman senate may be placed on a
parallel in its effects with the right of sanctioning
taxation in the constitutional monarchies of the present
day.