the war itself great exertions were made; a war contribution
was levied; the full contingent was called forth from
all their subjects and allies; even the proletarians
who were properly exempt from obligation of service
were called to arms. A Roman army remained as
a reserve in the capital. A second advanced
under the consul Tiberius Coruncanius into Etruria,
and dispersed the forces of Volci and Volsinii.
The main force was of course destined for Lower Italy;
its departure was hastened as much as possible, in
order to reach Pyrrhus while still in the territory
of Tarentum, and to prevent him and his forces from
forming a junction with the Samnites and other south
Italian levies that were in arms against Rome.
The Roman garrisons, that were placed in the Greek
towns of Lower Italy, were intended temporarily to
check the king’s progress. But the mutiny
of the troops stationed in Rhegium—one
of the legions levied from the Campanian subjects of
Rome under a Campanian captain Decius—deprived
the Romans of that important town. It was not,
however, transferred to the hands of Pyrrhus.
While on the one hand the national hatred of the Campanians
against the Romans undoubtedly contributed to produce
this military insurrection, it was impossible on the
other hand that Pyrrhus, who had crossed the sea to
shield and protect the Hellenes, could receive as
his allies troops who had put to death their Rhegine
hosts in their own houses. Thus they remained
isolated, in close league with their kinsmen and comrades
in crime, the Mamertines, that is, the Campanian mercenaries
of Agathocles, who had by similar means gained possession
of Messana on the opposite side of the straits; and
they pillaged and laid waste for their own behoof
the adjacent Greek towns, such as Croton, where they
put to death the Roman garrison, and Caulonia, which
they destroyed. On the other hand the Romans
succeeded, by means of a weak corps which advanced
along the Lucanian frontier and of the garrison of
Venusia, in preventing the Lucanians and Samnites
from uniting with Pyrrhus; while the main force—four
legions as it would appear, and so, with a corresponding
number of allied troops, at least 50,000 strong—marched
against Pyrrhus, under the consul Publius Laevinus.
Battle near Heraclea
With a view to cover the Tarentine colony of Heraclea, the king had taken up a position with his own and the Tarentine troops between that city and Pandosia (3) (474). The Romans, covered by their cavalry, forced the passage of the Siris, and opened the battle with a vehement and successful cavalry charge; the king, who led his cavalry in person, was thrown from his horse, and the Greek horsemen, panic-struck by the disappearance of their leader, abandoned the field to the squadrons of the enemy. Pyrrhus, however, put himself at the head of his infantry, and began a fresh and more decisive engagement. Seven times the legions and the phalanx met in shock of battle,