Pyrrhus and the Coalition

The affairs of the coalition were in no very favourable state when the king arrived.  The Roman consul indeed, as soon as he saw the soldiers of Milo taking the field against him instead of the Tarentine militia, had abandoned the attack on Tarentum and retreated to Apulia; but, with the exception of the territory of Tarentum, the Romans virtually ruled all Italy.  The coalition had no army in the field anywhere in Lower Italy; and in Upper Italy the Etruscans, who alone were still in arms, had in the last campaign (473) met with nothing but defeat.  The allies had, before the king embarked, committed to him the chief command of all their troops, and declared that they were able to place in the field an army of 350,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry.  The reality formed a sad contrast to these great promises.  The army, whose chief command had been committed to Pyrrhus, had still to be created; and for the time being the main resources available for forming it were those of Tarentum alone.  The king gave orders for the enlisting of an army of Italian mercenaries with Tarentine money, and called out the able-bodied citizens to serve in the war.  But the Tarentines had not so understood the agreement.  They had thought to purchase victory, like any other commodity, with money; it was a sort of breach of contract, that the king should compel them to fight for it themselves.  The more glad the citizens had been at first after Milo’s arrival to be quit of the burdensome service of mounting guard, the more unwillingly they now rallied to the standards of the king:  it was necessary to threaten the negligent with the penalty of death.  This result now justified the peace party in the eyes of all, and communications were entered into, or at any rate appeared to have been entered into, even with Rome.  Pyrrhus, prepared for such opposition, immediately treated Tarentum as a conquered city; soldiers were quartered in the houses, the assemblies of the people and the numerous clubs (—­sussitia—­) were suspended, the theatre was shut, the promenades were closed, and the gates were occupied with Epirot guards.  A number of the leading men were sent over the sea as hostages; others escaped the like fate by flight to Rome.  These strict measures were necessary, for it was absolutely impossible in any sense to rely upon the Tarentines.  It was only now that the king, in possession of that important city as a basis, could begin operations in the field.

Preparations in Rome—­
Commencement of the Conflict in Lower Italy

The Romans too were well aware of the conflict which awaited them.  In order first of all to secure the fidelity of their allies or, in other words, of their subjects, the towns that could not be depended on were garrisoned, and the leaders of the party of independence, where it seemed needful, were arrested or executed:  such was the case with a number of the members of the senate of Praeneste.  For