for January 1892.  We can, however, learn something from Captain Desbriere’s collection.  The perusal suggests, or indeed compels, the conclusion that the expedition was doomed to failure from the start.  It had no money, stores, or means of transport.  There was no hope of finding these in a country like the south-western corner of Ireland.  Grouchy’s decision not to land the troops who had reached Bantry Bay was no doubt dictated in reality by a perception of this; and by the discovery that, even if he got on shore, sympathisers with him would be practically non-existent.  On reading the letters now made public, one is convinced of Hoche’s unfitness for the leadership of such an enterprise.  The adoration of mediocrities is confined to no one cult and to no one age.  Hoche’s canonisation, for he is a prominent saint in the Republican calendar, was due not so much to what he did as to what he did not do.  He did not hold the supreme command in La Vendee till the most trying period of the war was past.  He did not continue the cruelties of the Jacobin emissaries in the disturbed districts; but then his pacificatory measures were taken when the spirit of ferocity which caused the horrors of the noyades and of the Terror had, even amongst the mob of Paris, burnt itself out.  He did not overthrow a constitutional Government and enslave his country as Bonaparte did; and, therefore, he is favourably compared with the latter, whose opportunities he did not have.  His letters show him to have been an adept in the art of traducing colleagues behind their backs.  In writing he called Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse ‘perfide,’ and spoke of his ‘mauvaise foi.’  He had a low opinion of General Humbert, whom he bracketed with Mascheret.  Grouchy, he said, was ‘un inconsequent paperassier,’ and General Vaillant ’un miserable ivrogne.’  He was placed in supreme command of the naval as well as of the military forces, and was allowed to select the commander of the former.  Yet he and his nominee were amongst the small fraction of the expeditionary body which never reached a place where disembarkation was possible.

Notwithstanding all this, the greater part of the fleet, and of the troops conveyed by it, did anchor in Bantry Bay without encountering an English man-of-war; and a large proportion continued in the Bay, unmolested by our navy, for more than a fortnight.  Is not this, it may be asked, a sufficient refutation of those who hold that command of the sea gives security against invasion?  As a matter of fact, command of the sea—­even in the case in question—­did prevent invasion from being undertaken, still more from being carried through, on a scale likely to be very formidable.  The total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom 633 were lost, owing to steps taken to avoid the hostile navy, before the expedition had got fully under way.  It is not necessary to rate Hoche’s capacity very highly in order to understand that he, who had seen something