forcats, to be commanded by a certain Mascheret, of whom Hoche wrote that he was ’le plus mauvais sujet dont on puisse purger la France.’  In a plan accepted and forwarded by Hoche, it was laid down that the band, on reaching the enemy’s country, was, if possible, not to fight, but to pillage; each man was to understand that he was sent to England to steal 100,000f., ‘pour ensuite finir sa carriere tranquillement dans l’aisance,’ and was to be informed that he would receive a formal pardon from the French Government.  The plan, extraordinary as it was, was one of the few put into execution.  The famous Fishguard Invasion was carried out by some fourteen hundred convicts commanded by an American adventurer named Tate.  The direction to avoid fighting was exactly obeyed by Colonel Tate and the armed criminals under his orders.  He landed in Cardigan Bay from a small squadron of French men-of-war at sunset on the 22nd February 1797; and, on the appearance of Lord Cawdor with the local Yeomanry and Militia, asked to be allowed to surrender on the 24th.  At a subsequent exchange of prisoners the French authorities refused to receive any of the worthies who had accompanied Tate.  At length 512 were allowed to land; but were imprisoned in the forts of Cherbourg.  The French records contain many expressions of the dread experienced by the inhabitants of the coast lest the English should put on shore in France the malefactors whom they had captured at Fishguard.

A more promising enterprise was that in which it was decided to obtain the assistance of the Dutch, at the time in possession of a considerable fleet.  The Dutch fleet was to put to sea with the object of engaging the English.  An army of 15,000 was then to be embarked in the ports of Holland, and was to effect a diversion in favour of another and larger body, which, starting from France, was to land in Ireland, repeating the attempt of Hoche in December 1796, which will be dealt with later on.  The enterprise was frustrated by the action of Admiral Duncan, who decisively defeated the Dutch fleet off Camperdown in October.  It might have been supposed that this would have driven home the lesson that no considerable military expedition across the water has any chance of success till the country sending it has obtained command of the sea; but it did not.  To Bonaparte the event was full of meaning; but no other French soldier seems to have learned it—­if we may take Captain Desbriere’s views as representative—­even down to the present day.  On the 23rd February 1798 Bonaparte wrote:  ’Operer une descente en Angleterre sans etre maitre de la mer est l’operation la plus hardie et la plus difficile qui ait ete faite.’  There has been much speculation as to the reasons which induced Bonaparte to quit the command of the ‘Army of England’ after holding it but a short time, and after having devoted great attention to its organisation and proposed methods of transport across the Channel.  The question is less difficult