classification of, the papers were begun in October 1898.  The book is compiled by Captain Desbriere, of the French Cuirassiers, who was specially authorised to continue his editorial labours even after he had resumed his ordinary military duties.  It bears the imprimatur of the staff of the army; and its preface is written by an officer who was—­and so signs himself—­chief of the historical section of that department.  There is no necessity to criticise the literary execution of the work.  What is wanted is to explain the nature of its contents and to indicate the lessons which may be drawn from them.  Nevertheless, attention may be called to a curious misreading of history contained in the preface.  In stating the periods which the different volumes of the book are to cover, the writer alludes to the Peace of Amiens, which, he affirms, England was compelled to accept by exhaustion, want of means of defence, and fear of the menaces of the great First Consul then disposing of the resources of France, aggrandised, pacified, and reinforced by alliances.  The book being what it is and coming whence it does, such a statement ought not to be passed over.  ‘The desire for peace,’ says an author so easily accessible as J. R. Green, ’sprang from no sense of national exhaustion.  On the contrary, wealth had never increased so fast....  Nor was there any ground for despondency in the aspect of the war itself.’  This was written in 1875 by an author so singularly free from all taint of Chauvinism that he expressly resolved that his work ‘should never sink into a drum and trumpet history.’  A few figures will be interesting and, it may be added, conclusive.  Between 1793 when the war began and 1802 when the Peace of Amiens interrupted it, the public income of Great Britain increased from L16,382,000 to L28,000,000, the war taxes not being included in the latter sum.  The revenue of France, notwithstanding her territorial acquisitions, sank from L18,800,000 to L18,000,000.  The French exports and imports by sea were annihilated; whilst the British exports were doubled and the imports increased more than 50 per cent.  The French Navy had at the beginning 73, at the end of the war 39, ships of the line; the British began the contest with 135 and ended it with 202.  Even as regards the army, the British force at the end of the war was not greatly inferior numerically to the French.  It was, however, much scattered, being distributed over the whole British Empire.  In view of the question under discussion, no excuse need be given for adducing these facts.

[Footnote 63:  1793-1805. Projetset_Tentatives_de_Debarquement_ auxIles_Britanniques_, par Edouard Desbriere, Capitaine brevete aux 1er Cuirassiers.  Paris, Chapelot et Cie. 1900. (Publie sous la direction de la section historique de l’Etat-Major de l’Armee.)]