examination that in reality there had been none.  ’During the [American] war the ship-yards in every port of Britain were full of employment; and consequently new ship-yards were set up in places where ships had never been built before.’  Even the diminution in the statistics of outward clearances indicated no diminution in the number of merchant ships or their crews.  The missing tonnage was merely employed elsewhere.  ’At this time there were about 1000 vessels of private property employed by the Government as transports and in other branches of the public service.’  Of course there had been some diminution due to the transfer of what had been British-American shipping to a new independent flag.  This would not have set free any men to join the navy.

When we come to the Revolutionary war we find ourselves confronted with similar conditions.  The case of this war has often been quoted as proving that in former days the navy had to rely practically exclusively on the merchant service when expansion was necessary.  In giving evidence before a Parliamentary committee about fifty years ago, Admiral Sir T. Byam Martin, referring to the great increase of the fleet in 1793, said, ’It was the merchant service that enabled us to man some sixty ships of the line and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels.’  He added that we had been able to bring promptly together ’about 35,000 or 40,000 men of the mercantile marine.’  The requirements of the navy amounted, as stated by the admiral, to about 40,000 men; to be exact, 39,045.  The number of seamen in the British Empire in 1793 was 118,952.  In the next year the number showed no diminution; in fact it increased, though but slightly, to 119,629.  How our merchant service could have satisfied the above-mentioned immense demand on it in addition to making good its waste and then have even increased is a thing that baffles comprehension.  No such example of elasticity is presented by any other institution.  Admiral Byam Martin spoke so positively, and, indeed, with such justly admitted authority, that we should have to give up the problem as insoluble were it not for other passages in the admiral’s own evidence.  It may be mentioned that all the witnesses did not hold his views.  Sir James Stirling, an officer of nearly if not quite equal authority, differed from him.  In continuation of his evidence Sir T. Byam Martin stated that afterwards the merchant service could give only a small and occasional supply, as ships arrived from foreign ports or as apprentices grew out of their time.  Now, during the remaining years of this war and throughout the Napoleonic war, great as were the demands of the navy, they only in one year, that of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, equalled the demand at the beginning of the Revolutionary war.  From the beginning of hostilities till the final close of the conflict in 1815 the number of merchant seamen fell only once—­viz. in 1795, the fall being 3200.  In 1795, however, the demand