When the Austro-Prussian war broke out in 1866, the Austrian commander-in-chief, General Benedek, published an order, probably still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the contempt for the enemy felt in the Imperial army.  Even those who perceived that the Prussian forces were not fit subjects of contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the Austrians.  Yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats with the Prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign to make peace to avoid further disasters.

At the beginning of the Franco-German war of 1870, the widespread anticipation of French victories was clearly shown by the unanimity with which the journalists of various nationalities illustrated their papers with maps giving the country between the French frontier and Berlin, and omitting the part of France extending to Paris.  In less than five weeks from the opening of hostilities events had made it certain that a map of the country to the eastward of Lorraine would be practically useless to a student of the campaign, unless it were to follow the route of the hundreds of thousands of French soldiers who were conveyed to Germany as prisoners of war.

It is to be specially noted that in the above enumeration only contests in which the result was unexpected—­unexpected not only by the beaten side but also by impartial observers—­have been specified.  In all wars one side or the other is defeated; and it has not been attempted to give a general resume of the history of war.  The object has been to show the frequency—­in all ages and in all circumstances of systematic, as distinguished from savage, warfare—­of the defeat of the force which by general consent was regarded as certain to win.  Now it is obvious that a result so frequently reappearing must have a distinct cause, which is well worth trying to find out.  Discovery of the cause may enable us to remove it in the future, and thus prevent results which are likely to be all the more disastrous because they have not been foreseen.

Professional military writers—­an expression which, as before explained, includes naval—­do not help us much in the prosecution of the search which is so eminently desirable.  As a rule, they have contrived rather to hide than to bring to light the object sought for.  It would be doing them injustice to assume that this has been done with deliberate intention.  It is much more likely due to professional bias, which exercises over the minds of members of definitely limited professions incessant and potent domination.  When alluding to occurrences included in the enumeration given above, they exhibit signs of a resolve to defend their profession against possible imputations of inefficiency, much more than a desire to get to the root of the matter.  This explains the unremitting eagerness of military writers to extol the special qualities developed by long-continued service habits and methods.  They are always apprehensive of the possibility of credit being given to fighting bodies more loosely organised and less precisely trained in peace time than the body to which they themselves belong.