Even the British soldiers—­of whom there were never many more than 50,000 in the Peninsula, and for some years not half that number—­were disdained until they had been encountered.  The French arms met with disappointment after disappointment.  On one occasion a whole French army, over 18,000 strong, surrendered to a Spanish force, and became prisoners of war.  Before the struggle closed there were six marshals of France with nearly 400,000 troops in the Peninsula.  The great efforts which these figures indicate were unsuccessful, and the intruders were driven from the country.  Yet they were the comrades of the victors of Austerlitz, of Jena, and of Wagram, and part of that mighty organisation which had planted its victorious standards in Berlin and Vienna, held down Prussia like a conquered province, and shattered into fragments the holy Roman Empire.

In 1812 the British Navy was at the zenith of its glory.  It had not only defeated all its opponents; it had also swept the seas of the fleets of the historic maritime powers—­of Spain, of France, which had absorbed the Italian maritime states, of the Netherlands, of Denmark.  Warfare, nearly continuous for eighteen, and uninterrupted for nine years, had transformed the British Navy into an organisation more nearly resembling a permanently maintained force than it had been throughout its previous history.  Its long employment in serious hostilities had saved it from some of the failings which the narrow spirit inherent in a close profession is only too sure to foster.  It had, however, a confidence—­not unjustified by its previous exploits—­in its own invincibility.  This confidence did not diminish, and was not less ostentatiously exhibited, as its great achievements receded more and more into the past.  The new enemy who now appeared on the farther side of the Atlantic was not considered formidable.  In the British Navy there were 145,000 men.  In the United States Navy the number of officers, seamen, and marines available for ocean service was less than 4500—­an insignificant numerical addition to the enemies with whom we were already contending.  The subsequent and rapid increase in the American personnel to 18,000 shows the small extent to which it could be considered a ‘regular’ force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered by the hastily enrolled additions.  Our defeats in the war of 1812 have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention.  Rebuffs of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at New Orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of Busaco, Fuentes de Onoro, and Salamanca, met with a serious defeat.