Africa, in Sicily, and in Italy.  The mere list of countries shows that the mobility and endurance of the Roman forces during a period in which little creditable is generally looked for were not inferior to their discipline and courage.  Yet they met with disastrous defeat after all, and at the hands of races which they had more than once proved themselves capable of withstanding.  It could not have been because the later Roman equipment was inferior, the organisation less elaborate, or the training less careful than those of their barbarian enemies.

Though it is held by some in these days that the naval power of Spain in the latter part of the sixteenth century was not really formidable, that does not appear to have been the opinion of contemporaries, whether Spaniards or otherwise.  Some English seamen of the time did, indeed, declare their conviction that Philip the Second’s navy was not so much to be feared as many of their fellow-countrymen thought; but, in the public opinion of the age, Spain was the greatest, or indeed the one great, naval state.  She possessed a more systematically organised navy than any other country having the ocean for a field of action had then, or till long afterwards.  Even Genoa and Venice, whose operations, moreover, were restricted to Mediterranean waters, could not have been served by more finished specimens of the naval officer and the man-of-war’s man of the time than a large proportion of the military personnel of the regular Spanish fleet.  As Basques, Castilians, Catalans, or Aragonese, or all combined, the crews of Spanish fighting ships could look back upon a glorious past.  It was no wonder that, by common consent of those who manned it, the title of ‘Invincible’ was informally conferred upon the Armada which, in 1588, sailed for the English Channel.  How it fared is a matter of common knowledge.  No one could have been more surprised at the result than the gallant officers who led its squadrons.

Spain furnishes another instance of the unexpected overthrow of a military body to which long cohesion and precise organisation were believed to have secured invincibility.  The Spanish was considered the ‘most redoubtable infantry in Europe’ till its unexpected defeat at Rocroi.  The effects of this defeat were far-reaching.  Notwithstanding the bravery of her sons, which has never been open to question, and, in fact, has always been conspicuous, the military superiority of Spain was broken beyond repair.

In the history of other countries are to be found examples equally instructive.  The defeats of Almansa, Brihuega, and Villaviciosa were nearly contemporary with the victories of Blenheim and Ramillies; and the thousands of British troops compelled to lay down their arms at the first named belonged to the same service as their fellow-countrymen who so often marched to victory under Marlborough.  A striking example of the disappointment which lies in wait for military self-satisfaction was furnished by the defeat of Soubise at Rossbach by Frederick the Great.  Before the action the French had ostentatiously shown their contempt for their opponent.