[Footnote 57:  In his Historyof_Scotland_ (1873).  J. H. M. Burton, speaking of the Orkney and Shetland isles in the Viking times, says (vol. i. p. 320):  ’Those who occupied them were protected, not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete command over the North Sea held by the fleets that found shelter in the fiords and firths.’]

In the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements.  When the main fleet of a country is at a distance—­which it ought not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet—­a small hostile expedition may slip across, say the Channel, throw shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home again unmolested.  Its action would have no sort of influence on the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless.  It would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated system of ‘cross-raiding,’ discarded centuries ago, not at all for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war could be more effectually waged in other ways.  The nation in command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal submission of an already defeated enemy, as Russia did when at war with Sweden in 1719; but in such a case the other side cannot retaliate.  Temporary command of local waters will also permit of operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks; but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the time available.  If the duration of the temporary command is insufficient the operation must fail.  It must fail even if the earlier steps have been taken successfully.  Temporary command of the Baltic in war might enable a German force to occupy an Aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into permanent command, Germany could make no use of the acquisition, which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former possessors.  The command of the English Channel, which Napoleon wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only temporary.  It is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened in Egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite independently of the proceedings of Villeneuve, he hesitated to risk a second battle of the Nile and the loss of a second army.  It may have been this which justified his later statement that he did not really mean to invade England.  In any case, the English practice of fixing the station of their fleet wherever that of the enemy’s was, would have seriously shortened the duration of his command of the Channel, even if it had allowed it to be won at all.  Moreover, attempts to carry out a great operation of war against time as well as against the efforts of the enemy to prevent it are in the highest degree perilous.