demand for this salute.  It was insisted upon.  War ensued; but in the end the Dutch acknowledged by solemn treaties their obligation to render the salute.  The time for exacting it, however, was really past.  S. R. Gardiner[54] maintains that though the ’question of the flag’ was the occasion, it was not the cause of the war.  There was not much, if any, piracy in the English Channel which the King of England was specially called upon to suppress, and if there had been the merchant vessels of the age were generally able to defend themselves, while if they were not their governments possessed force enough to give them the necessary protection.  We gave up our claim to exact the salute in 1805.

[Footnote 51:  W. E. Hall, Treatiseon_International_Law_, 4th ed. 1895, p. 146.]

[Footnote 52:  Hall, pp. 48, 49.]

[Footnote 53:  J. K. Laughton, ‘Sovereignty of the Sea,’ Fortnightly Review, August 1866.]

[Footnote 54:  TheFirst_Dutch_War_ (Navy Records Society), 1899.]

The necessity of the foregoing short account of the ’Sovereignty or Dominion of the Seas’ will be apparent as soon as we come to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series of struggles, for the command of the sea.  Gaining this was the result of our wars with the Dutch in the seventeenth century.  At the time of the first Dutch war, 1652-54, and probably of the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen, believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our part to retain, and on that of the Dutch to put an end to, the English sovereignty or dominion.  The obstinacy of the Dutch in objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the English flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most Englishmen, and probably of most Dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which other reasons may have rendered inevitable.  The remarkable thing about the Dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea.  We came out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the greatest, naval power.  It is this which prompted Vice-Admiral P. H. Colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such as ‘absolute or assured,’ ‘temporary,’ ’with definite ulterior purpose,’ &c.  An explanation that would make all these terms intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here.  It will be enough to say that the absolute command—­of attempts to gain which, as Colomb tells us, the Anglo-Dutch wars were the most complete example—­is nothing but an attribute of the nation whose power on the sea is paramount.  It exists and may be visible in time of peace.  The command which, as said above, expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in time of war.  It can easily be seen that the former is essential to an empire like the British, the parts of which are bound together by maritime communications.  Inability to keep