it.  It was possible for the Chinese to march there by land.  The Japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged to cross the water.  It will be seen at once that not only the success of the Japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power.  The Japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea.  Their navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in Korea, and for another which was landed in the Chinese province of Shantung.  The Chinese land-forces were defeated.  The navy of japan, being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister service supplied or reinforced as required.  It was, however, not the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the Chinese efforts at defence, and really terminated the war.  What the navy did was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power, may be expected of a navy.  It made the transport of the army across the sea possible; and enabled it to do what of itself the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance of the enemy.

[Footnote 48:  NavalWarfare_, 3rd ed. p. 436.]

The issue of the Spanish-American war, at least as regards the mere defeat of Spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion.  That Spain, even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the United States must have been evident even to Spaniards.  Be that as it may, an early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare.  Mahan says of it that, ’while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto this day.’[49] The Spaniards were defeated by the superiority of the American sea-power.  ‘A million of the best soldiers,’ says Mahan, ’would have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea.’  That control was obtained and kept by the United States navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops—­and their subsequent reinforcement and supply—­to Spanish territory, which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army on shore.  That it was the navy which made this final conquest possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident by the action of the United States Government, which stopped a military expedition on the point of starting for Cuba until the sea was cleared of all Spanish naval force worth attention.

[Footnote 49:  Lessonsof_the_War_with_Spain_, p. 16.]