for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its wisdom, it had still further weakened our fleet by dividing it (Vice-Admiral Killigrew having been sent to the Mediterranean with a squadron), and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to take the necessary steps to repair this error.  The Government having omitted, as even British Governments sometimes do, to gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements of the enemy, Torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a considerably superior French fleet under Tourville, one of the greatest of French sea-officers.  Of late years the intentions of the French have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that in England at the time Tourville’s movements were believed to be preliminary to invasion.  Whether Tourville deliberately meant his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise his victory would have been without any valuable result.  Torrington saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could, though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing serious harm.  Though personally not a believer in the imminence of invasion, the English admiral knew that ’most men were in fear that the French would invade.’  His own view was, ’that whilst we had a fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.’  Of late years controversy has raged round this phrase, ‘a fleet in being,’ and the strategic principle which it expresses.  Most seamen were at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with Torrington.  This might be supposed enough to settle the question.  It has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval strategy.  It was made at the time a matter of party politics.  This is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it should be discussed.  Both as a strategist and as a tactician Torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries.  The only English admirals who can be placed above him are Hawke and Nelson.  He paid the penalty of his pre-eminence:  he could not make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages of his proceedings.  Mahan, who is specially qualified to do him full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a consideration of Torrington’s case, evidently because he had no sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment.  The admiral’s character had been taken away already by Macaulay, who did have ample evidence before him.  William III, with all his fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal to that of Napoleon; and Napoleon, in naval strategy, was often wrong.  William III understood that subject even less than the French emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable of understanding it.  Consequently Torrington’s action has been put down to jealousy of the Dutch.  There have been people who accused Nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of