and filled with menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence.  The third Dutch war may not have settled directly the position of England in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country above all other maritime states,—­in the position, in fact, which Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the British Empire, whichever name may be given it, has retained up to the present.  It also manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power.  The United Provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest monarchies in the world, France and England, were not destroyed.  Indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in the State system of Europe.  The Republic ’owed this astonishing result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its sea-power.’  The effort, however, had undermined its strength and helped forward its decline.

[Footnote 41:  Mommsen, ii. p. 52.]

The war which was ended by the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 presents two features of exceptional interest:  one was the havoc wrought on English commerce by the enemy; the other was Torrington’s conduct at and after the engagement off Beachy Head.  Mahan discusses the former with his usual lucidity.  At no time has war against commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period.  We suffered ’infinitely more than in any former war.’  Many of our merchants were ruined; and it is affirmed that the English shipping was reduced to the necessity of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags.  The explanation is that Louis XIV made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets.  Our navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could be spared to protect our maritime trade.  This is only another way of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose the enemy’s main force.  Notwithstanding our losses we were on the winning side in the conflict.  Much misery and ruin had been caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war.

Torrington’s proceedings in July 1690 were at the time the subject of much angry debate.  The debate, still meriting the epithet angry, has been renewed within the last few years.  The matter has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible.  Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington—­the later peerage is a viscounty held by the Byng family—­was in command of the allied English and Dutch fleet in the Channel.  ‘The disparity of force,’ says Mahan, ’was still in favour of France in 1690, but it was not so great as the year before.’  We can measure the ability of the then English Government