The great thing was to bring the whole broadside force
to bear on an enemy. Whether this was to be impartially
distributed throughout the hostile line or concentrated
on one part of it depended on the character of particular
admirals. It would have been strange if a period
so long and so rich in incidents had afforded no materials
for forming a judgment on the real significance of
sea-power. The text, so to speak, chosen by Mahan
is that, notwithstanding the changes wrought in naval
materiel during the last half-century, we can
find in the history of the past instructive illustrations
of the general principles of maritime war. These
illustrations will prove of value not only ’in
those wider operations which embrace a whole theatre
of war,’ but also, if rightly applied, ’in
the tactical use of the ships and weapons’ of
our own day. By a remarkable coincidence the
same doctrine was being preached at the same time and
quite independently by the late Vice-Admiral Philip
Colomb in his work on ‘Naval Warfare.’
As a prelude to the second Dutch war we find a repetition
of a process which had been adopted somewhat earlier.
That was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory.
Until the seventeenth century had well begun, naval,
or combined naval and military, operations against
the distant possessions of an enemy had been practically
restricted to raiding or plundering attacks on commercial
centres. The Portuguese territory in South America
having come under Spanish dominion in consequence of
the annexation of Portugal to Spain, the Dutch—as
the power of the latter country declined—attempted
to reduce part of that territory into permanent possession.
This improvement on the practice of Drake and others
was soon seen to be a game at which more than one
could play. An expedition sent by Cromwell to
the West Indies seized the Spanish island of Jamaica,
which has remained in the hands of its conquerors
to this day. In 1664 an English force occupied
the Dutch North American settlements on the Hudson.
Though the dispossessed rulers were not quite in a
position to throw stones at sinners, this was rather
a raid than an operation of recognised warfare, because
it preceded the formal outbreak of hostilities.
The conquered territory remained in English hands for
more than a century, and thus testified to the efficacy
of a sea-power which Europe had scarcely begun to
recognise. Neither the second nor the third Dutch
war can be counted amongst the occurrences to which
Englishmen may look back with unalloyed satisfaction;
but they, unquestionably, disclosed some interesting
manifestations of sea-power. Much indignation
has been expressed concerning the corruption and inefficiency
of the English Government of the day, and its failure
to take proper measures for keeping up the navy as
it should have been kept up. Some, perhaps a good
deal, of this indignation was deserved; but it would
have been nearly as well deserved by every other government