on which permanent expansion must rest.  They wanted to make sure of the line of communication first.  To effect this a sea-going marine of both war and commerce and, for further expansion, stations on the way were essential.  The chart of the world furnishes evidence of the wisdom and the thoroughness of their procedure.  Taught by the experience of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, when unimpeded by the political circumstances of the time, and provided with suitable equipment, the English displayed their energy in distant seas.  It now became simply a question of the efficiency of sea-power.  If this was not a quality of that of the English, then their efforts were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious.  The principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in connection with the exploring or colonising activity of most other great nations even down to our own time.  They were really unofficial speculations in which, if the Government took part at all, it was for the sake of the profit expected and almost, if not exactly, like any private adventurer.  The participation of the Government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth while to note.  It conveyed a hint—­and quite consciously—­to all whom it might concern that the speculations were ‘under-written’ by the whole sea-power of England.  The forces of more than one state had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of enemies in the Mediterranean or in the Narrow Seas.  They had been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications across not very extensive areas of water.  In the sixteenth century they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms.  This, naturally enough, led to collisions.  The contention waxed hot, and was virtually decided when the Armada shaped course to the northward after the fight off Gravelines.

The expeditions against the Spanish Indies and, still more, those against Philip II’s peninsular territory, had helped to define the limitations of sea-power.  It became evident, and it was made still more evident in the next century, that for a great country to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone.  It must also have an adequate and properly organised mobile army.  Notwithstanding the number of times that this lesson has been repeated, we have been slow to learn it.  It is doubtful if we have learned it even yet.  English seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; for they have always demanded—­at any rate for upwards of three centuries—­that expeditions against foreign territory over-sea should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops.  On the other hand, the necessity of organising the army of a maritime insular state, and of training