Sea-Power and Other Studies eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 277 pages of information about Sea-Power and Other Studies.

Sea-Power and Other Studies eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 277 pages of information about Sea-Power and Other Studies.
of his ’Short History of the Royal Navy’—­it will be found instructive and worthy of careful study at the present day.  Each of the principal events in our early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of the idea conveyed by the term ‘sea-power,’ and of the accuracy with which its meaning was apprehended at the time.  To take a very early case, we may cite the defeat of Eustace the Monk by Hubert de Burgh in 1217.  Reinforcements and supplies had been collected at Calais for conveyance to the army of Prince Louis of France and the rebel barons who had been defeated at Lincoln.  The reinforcements tried to cross the Channel under the escort of a fleet commanded by Eustace.  Hubert de Burgh, who had stoutly held Dover for King John, and was faithful to the young Henry III, heard of the enemy’s movements.  ‘If these people land,’ said he, ‘England is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.’  He reasoned in almost the same words as Raleigh about four centuries afterwards, and undoubtedly ’had grasped the true principles of the defence of England.’  He put to sea and defeated his opponent.  The fleet on which Prince Louis and the rebellious barons had counted was destroyed; and with it their enterprise.  ’No more admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by Englishmen on water.’[38] As introductory to a long series of naval operations undertaken with a like object, it has deserved detailed mention here.

[Footnote 37:  Armada, Introd. (Navy Records Society).]

[Footnote 38:  Hannay, p. 7.]

The sixteenth century was marked by a decided advance in both the development and the application of sea-power.  Previously its operation had been confined to the Mediterranean or to coast waters outside it.  Spanish or Basque seamen—­by their proceedings in the English Channel—­had proved the practicability of, rather than been engaged in, ocean warfare.  The English, who withstood them, were accustomed to seas so rough, to seasons so uncertain, and to weather so boisterous, that the ocean had few terrors for them.  All that was wanting was a sufficient inducement to seek distant fields of action and a development of the naval art that would permit them to be reached.  The discovery of the New World supplied the first; the consequently increased length of voyages and of absence from the coast led to the second.  The world had been moving onwards in other things as well as in navigation.  Intercommunication was becoming more and more frequent.  What was done by one people was soon known to others.  It is a mistake to suppose that, because the English had been behindhand in the exploration of remote regions, they were wanting in maritime enterprise.  The career of the Cabots would of itself suffice to render such a supposition doubtful.  The English had two good reasons for postponing voyages to and settlement in far-off lands.  They had their hands full nearer home; and they thoroughly, and as it were by instinct, understood the conditions

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Sea-Power and Other Studies from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.