The efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely on the experience of its working gained in time of peace.  Why do we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails before the stress of serious emergency is upon us?  There are two reasons.  One is, because we have used the permanent base method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find it difficult to form a conception of any other.  The other reason is that the direct supply method is thought to be too costly.  The first reason need not detain us.  It is not worthy of even a few minutes’ consideration.  The second reason deserves full investigation.

We ought to be always alive to the necessity of economy.  The only limit to economy of money in any plan of naval organisation is that we should not carry it so far that it will be likely to impair efficiency.  Those who are familiar with the correspondence of the great sea-officers of former days will have noticed how careful they were to prevent anything like extravagant expenditure.  This inclination towards a proper parsimony of naval funds became traditional in our service.  The tradition has, perhaps, been rather weakened in these days of abundant wealth; but we should do our best not to let it die out.  Extravagance is a serious foe to efficient organisation, because where it prevails there is a temptation to try imperfectly thought-out experiments, in the belief that, if they fail, there will still be plenty of money to permit others to be tried.  This, of course, encourages slovenly want of system, which is destructive of good organisation.

We may assume, for the purposes of our investigation, that our permanently equipped secondary base contains a stock of 10,000 tons of coal.  Any proportionate quantity, however, may be substituted for this, as the general argument will remain unaffected.  As already intimated, coal is so much greater in bulk and aggregate cost than any other class of stores that, if we arrange for its supply, the provision of the rest is a comparatively small matter.  The squadron which we have had in view requires an estimated amount of 46,000 tons of coal in six months’ period specified, and a further quantity of 4600 tons may be expected to suffice for the ships employed in the neighbouring waters during the remainder of the year.  This latter amount would have to be brought in smaller cargoes, say, five of 920 tons each.  Allowing for the colliers required during the six months whilst the whole squadron has to be supplied an average cargo of 2300 tons, we should want twenty arrivals with an aggregate of 46,000 tons, and later on five arrivals of smaller colliers with an aggregate of 4600 tons to complete the year.