that our ships must resort.  We shall have to do one of two things—­either let him carry on his operations undisturbed, or conform to his movements.  To this is due the common, if not invariable, experience of naval warfare, that the fleet which assumes the offensive has to establish what are sometimes called ‘flying bases,’ to which it can resort at will.  This explains why Nelson rarely used Gibraltar as a base; why we occupied Balaclava in 1854; and why the Americans used Guantanamo Bay in 1898.  The flying base is not fortified or garrisoned in advance.  It is merely a convenient anchorage, in a good position as regards the circumstances of the war; and it can be abandoned for another, and resumed, if desirable, as the conditions of the moment dictate.

It is often argued that maintenance of stocks of stores at a secondary base gives a fleet a free hand and at least relieves it from the obligation of defending the line of communications.  We ought to examine both contentions.  It is not easy to discover where the freedom comes in if you must always proceed to a certain place for supplies, whether convenient or not.  It may be, and very likely will be, of the utmost importance in war for a ship to remain on a particular station.  If her coal is running short and can only be replenished by going to a base, go to the base she must, however unfortunate the consequences.  It has been mentioned already that nearly every item on our store list has to be brought to a base by sea.  Let us ascertain to what extent the accumulation of a stock at a place removes the necessity of defending the communication line.  Coal is so much the greater item that consideration of it will cover that of all the rest.

The squadron, as assumed, requires about 11,500 tons of coal every five weeks in peace time.  Some is commonly obtained from contractors at foreign ports; but to avoid complicating the subject we may leave contract issues out of consideration.  If you keep a stock of 10,000 tons at your permanent secondary base, you will have enough to last your ships about four-and-a-half weeks.  Consequently you must have a stream of colliers running to the place so as to arrive at intervals of not more than about thirty days.  Calculations founded on the experience of manoeuvres show that in war time ships would require nearly three times the quantity used in peace.  It follows that, if you trebled your stock of coal at the base and made it 30,000 tons, you would in war still require colliers carrying that amount to arrive about every four weeks.  Picture the line of communications with the necessary colliers on it, and see to what extent you are released from the necessity of defending it.  The bulk of other stores being much less than that of coal, you could, no doubt, maintain a sufficient stock of them to last through the probable duration of the war; but, as you must keep your communications open to ensure the arrival of your coal, it would be as easy for the other stores to reach you as it would be for the coal itself.  Why oblige yourself to use articles kept long in store when much fresher ones could be obtained?  Therefore the maintenance of store depots at a secondary base no more releases you from the necessity of guarding your communications than it permits freedom of movement to your ships.