There had been a demand in the country that the defence of our shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats.  This was resisted by the naval officers.  Nelson had already said, ‘Our first defence is close to the enemy’s ports,’ thus agreeing with a long line of eminent British seamen in their view of our strategy.  Lord St. Vincent said that ’Our great reliance is on the vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.’  These are memorable words, which we should do well to ponder in these days.  The Government of the day insisted on having the coastal boats; but St. Vincent succeeded in postponing the preparation of them till the cruising ships had been manned.  His plan of defence has been described by his biographer as ’a triple line of barricade; 50-gun ships, frigates, sloops of war, and gun-vessels upon the coast of the enemy; in the Downs opposite France another squadron, but of powerful ships of the line, continually disposable, to support the former or attack any force of the enemy which, it might be imagined possible, might slip through the squadron hanging over the coast; and a force on the beach on all the shores of the English ports, to render assurance doubly sure.’  This last item was the one that St. Vincent had been compelled to adopt, and he was careful that it should be in addition to those measures of defence in the efficacy of which he and his brother seamen believed.  Concerning it his biographer makes the following remark:  ’It is to be noted that Lord St. Vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats by gunboats,’ &c.  He objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful to have the sea-going ships manned.  Speaking of this coastal defence scheme, he said:  ’It would be a good bone for the officers to pick, but a very dear one for the country.’

The defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy of the time.  An important part was played by our fleets and groups of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral vessels carrying commodities to or from British ports.  The strategy of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size.  This can be seen in the lists of successive years.  In January 1803 the number of cruising frigates in commission was 107, and of sloops and smaller vessels 139, the total being 246.  In 1804 the numbers were:  Frigates, 108; sloops, &c., 181; with a total of 289.  In 1805 the figures